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Patrick F. Todd*
Digital Platforms and the Leverage
Problem
ABSTRACT
Antitrust policy towards firms that “leverage” their market power to 
grant themselves competitive advantages in adjacent markets has come 
to the fore in recent times with the growth of digital platforms in sec-
tors such as online search, mobile operating systems, online market-
places and social media. This Article analyzes the historical origins 
and Chicago critique of the leverage doctrine and how these informed 
the development of antitrust policy. Antitrust law currently distin-
guishes between pro- and anti-competitive leveraging in order to 
achieve the optimal balance between promoting competition in adja-
cent markets and preserving the legitimate ability of platform owners 
to enter and compete in adjacent markets. Thus, leveraging is only un-
lawful under the Sherman Act when it results in consumer harm. The 
Article then considers recent proposals to address perceived competi-
tion issues in digital platform markets, which condemn leveraging 
even if it benefits consumers in order to protect competitors in adjacent 
markets from competition on the merits. Empirical criteria that have 
been present in comparable instances of such intervention, such as bot-
tleneck power over distribution, widespread harm to adjacent market 
competition, static product boundaries, and a lack or unimportance of 
integrative efficiencies, are not satisfied in the current context. Absent 
some proof that they are, the consumer welfare framework under anti-
trust law should prevail without recourse to more intrusive 
intervention.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In June 2017, the European Commission (EC) fined Google C= 2.4
billion for “leverag[ing] its market dominance in general internet
search into a separate market, comparison shopping.”1 At the time,
1. European Commission Press Release IP/17/1785, Antitrust: Commission Fines
Google C= 2.42 Billion for Abusing Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal
Advantage to Own Comparison Shopping Service (June 27, 2017).
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this was the largest fine ever imposed in an antitrust case.2 One year
later, the EC smashed its own record, fining Google a further C= 4.34
billion for licensing its mobile applications to device manufacturers
using Google’s Android operating system (OS) in a single bundle.3
Across the globe, there have been fresh calls to investigate the activi-
ties of Google and other tech firms, such as Apple, Facebook, and Am-
azon (together, GAFA), in multiple lines of business that are adjacent
to their core business models.4 A fear pervades that, once these firms
have entered particular adjacent markets, they will favor their own
adjacent offerings to the competitive detriment of their competitors.
What links these cases, investigations, and accusations is the doctrine
of leverage.
Leverage occurs when a firm exploits its monopoly power in one
market in order to extend that power to an adjacent market, subse-
quently exercising market power in that market by raising prices or
restricting output or quality.5 Leverage, in antitrust circles, has
evolved into a term of art and is distinguishable from conduct that
suppresses competition in the already-dominated market.6 By defini-
tion, leverage involves “the establishment of a new or second monop-
oly.”7 In the context of digital platforms, leveraging has come to
2. Google strongly contests the merits of the case. See Case T-612/17, Google and
Alphabet v. Comm’n, 2017 E.C.R. C 369/37.
3. Council Regulation 1/2003, 2018, (AT.40099) (EC) (Google Android) (July 18,
2018) [hereinafter Android Decision].
4. See, e.g., Letter from Orrin G. Hatch, U.S. Sen., to Joseph Simons, Chairman,
Fed. Trade Comm’n (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/cache/
files/5935a818-76c5-4ad6-ab29-51241b9a8a83/2018.08.30%20Senator%20Hatch
%20Letter%20to%20FTC%20Chairman%20Simons.pdf (urging “the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) to reconsider the competitive effects of Google’s conduct
in search and digital advertising.”); Makena Kelly, Google Under Antitrust Inves-
tigation by 50 Attorneys General, THE VERGE (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www
.theverge.com/2019/9/9/20857440/google-antitrust-investigation-attorneys-gener
al-advertising-search [https://perma.unl.edu/C54A-R9AZ].
5. See, e.g., Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953)
(holding that “monopolistic leverage” occurs when “a seller exploits his dominant
position in one market to expand his empire into the next”); Louis Kaplow, Exten-
sion of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 516 (1985)
(“Traditional leverage theory claims that a monopolist’s use of its power in its
own market to control activities in another market typically represents an at-
tempt to spread its power to the other market.”); Robin Cooper Feldman, Defen-
sive Leveraging in Antitrust, 87 GEO. L.J. 2079, 2081 (1999) (“Leverage occurs
when a monopolist uses power in one market to induce or foreclose sales in an-
other market and thereby monopolize both”). Use of the term “adjacent market”
is intended to mean a line of business that is complementary to the platform
owner’s core offering and is not intended to represent that the line of business
constitutes a separate market for the purpose of market definition.
6. Cf. Ward S. Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE
L.J. 19 (1957) (distinguishing “leverage as a revenue-maximizing device and lev-
erage as a monopoly-creating device.”).
7. Id. at 20.
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encompass a wide variety of conduct. Examples include platform own-
ers promoting their own adjacent offerings in search result pages,
bundling or pre-installing their adjacent offerings with platform
software code, shutting off access to Application Programming Inter-
faces (APIs) or data to third parties, or generally reducing the compat-
ibility of third-party offerings with the platform as a means of
distribution. This Article uses the term “leveraging” to encompass any
form of conduct that makes it harder for third-parties to distribute
their products or services through a platform, while benefitting the
platform owner’s competing product.
Importantly, leverage is not a standalone theory of abuse in anti-
trust law. It is better thought of as a category that encompasses nu-
merous legal theories of harm, such as tying and refusals to deal,
where the conduct’s competitive effects are felt in a market distinct
from the one in which the defendant is said to be dominant.8 Leverag-
ing is distinct from adjacent market entry or “vertical integration,”
which denotes the mere presence of a firm in multiple related or com-
plementary markets, rather than dealing in the production or use of
the complementary product at arm’s length through the price system.9
Leverage, on the other hand, is the act of distorting competition in the
adjacent market by, through various means, exploiting market power
in the primary market. However, adjacent market entry and leverag-
ing are inherently linked due to the belief held by some that the for-
mer begets the latter.
Due to the historic development of the leverage doctrine, the term
“leverage” has negative connotations and is often associated with con-
duct that has no effect or purpose apart from the suppression of com-
petition. However, a significant insight of the Chicago School of
antitrust analysis was that monopolists often leverage in order to pro-
vide consumers with better products or lower prices. Though some as-
pects of the Chicago critique stand rebutted by so-called “Post-
Chicago” insights, its fundamental contribution—that leveraging is
predominantly pro-competitive and benefits consumers—remains vi-
8. See infra note 115; ROBERT O’DONOGHUE & JORGE PADILLA, THE LAW AND ECO-
NOMICS OF ARTICLE 102 TFEU 153 (2d ed., 2013) (“Leveraging is not an indepen-
dent ground of abuse [in EU competition law]. It is simply a convenient (and
sometimes misleading) label to identify cases that have in common the feature
that a dominant firm uses its power on one market to commit an abuse that has
effects in an adjacent . . . market.”).
9. This Article prefers the term “adjacent market entry” to describe production that
takes place inside the boundaries of the firm, rather than vertical integration,
which implies participation in “more than one successive stage of the production
or distribution of goods or services.” See DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M.
PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 395 (4th ed.). For further discussion
on why the term “vertical integration” is a misnomer in certain situations, see
Bruce M. Owen, Antitrust and Vertical Integration in “New Economy” Industries
with Application to Broadband Access, 38 REV. INDUS. ORG. 363 (2011).
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tal when considering the behavior of platform firms in the digital
economy. Consumers often benefit from adjacent market entry and
leveraging by dominant firms because those firms can use their ex-
isting positions to provide better quality or lower prices that they are
uniquely placed to provide. This does not mean that leveraging is or
should be per se legal. Under the existing regime, it is possible to
tackle anti-competitive leverage while condoning behavior that consti-
tutes competition on the merits.
However, some scholars believe that the entry by large digital plat-
form firms into lines of business adjacent to their core offerings is giv-
ing rise to competition problems that are beyond the reach of the
existing antitrust toolbox, including the leveraging of market power.10
These scholars suggest that the growth of GAFA has led to a concomi-
tant decrease in innovation and investment by firms that distribute
their goods and services (digital or otherwise) through these firms’
platforms.
In response, some scholars have suggested that platform owners
should face a higher (or claimant firms a lower) burden of proof when
leveraging complaints are brought.11 Others suggest a regulatory
framework to complement antitrust law in the form of a “non-discrimi-
nation” standard, which would altogether prevent vertically-inte-
grated platform firms from tying, bundling, integrating, or otherwise
privileging their own adjacent products (despite the efficiencies that
this conduct may produce).12 Others, notably the Neo-Brandeisians
(so-called in homage to Justice Louis Brandeis, an early and famous
exponent of “small-business welfare”), view any adjacent market entry
by dominant firms as inherently concerning because those firms are
more likely than not to subsequently leverage their market power to
exclude rivals in the adjacent markets, thus anti-competitively
spreading their tentacles across multiple markets ‘til kingdom come.13
10. Other issues include privacy concerns raised by data-collection, excessive concen-
tration in certain markets and the impact of digital platforms on news
consumption.
11. Jacques Cre´mer, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye & Heike Schweitzer, Competition
Policy for the Digital Era, EUR. COMM’N, 1, 42 (2019) [hereinafter EC Digital
Competition Report]; STIGLER CENTER COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF DIGITAL
PLATFORMS, MARKET STRUCTURE AND ANTITRUST SUBCOMMITTEE, REPORT 77
(2019) [hereinafter STIGLER] (suggesting that “the proof requirements imposed
upon antitrust plaintiffs [are relaxed or reversed] in appropriate cases”).
12. See Kevin Caves & Hal Singer, When the Econometrician Shrugged: Identifying
and Plugging Gaps in the Consumer Welfare Standard, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV.
(2019); Frank A. Pasquale, Internet Nondiscrimination Principles: Commercial
Ethics for Carriers and Search Engines, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 263 (2008) (advo-
cating neutrality principles for search engines).
13. Lina M. Khan, The Separation of Platforms and Commerce, 119 COLUM. L. REV.
973 (2019) (proposing structural separation between platforms and adjacent ser-
vices); TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EM-
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Neo-Brandeisians would solve this by blocking dominant firms from
entering into adjacent markets. This Article posits that all three of
these proposals, to varying degrees, would abandon the interests of
consumers in favor of less efficient small businesses, at the expense of
consumer welfare.
Meanwhile, regulators across the globe are paying close attention
to antitrust’s leverage problem. In 2018 and early 2019, the U.S. Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC) held a series of hearings on Competition
and Consumer Protection in the twenty-first century, which included
a discussion of exclusionary conduct in digital markets.14 In July
2019, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that it had
launched a review of digital platforms, including how they purportedly
achieved market power and whether they “are engaging in practices
that have reduced competition, stifled innovation, or otherwise
harmed consumers.”15 In the European Union (EU), the EC held a
conference and commissioned the production of a report to examine
competition policy in the digital era in early 2019.16 Also in 2019, the
Australian competition authority published a final report containing a
series of recommendations aimed at leveraging in digital markets.17
Finally, in the United Kingdom (UK), a panel chaired by Jason
Furman recommended a series of changes and updates required for
antitrust law to operate effectively in digital markets (the Furman In-
quiry Report).18 This spurred the launch by the UK Competition and
Markets Authority (CMA) of a digital markets strategy, including the
PIRES (2010) (describing these controls on adjacent market entry as the
“Separations Principle”). See also MARSHALL STEINBAUM & MAURICE E. STUCKE,
THE EFFECTIVE COMPETITION STANDARD: A NEW STANDARD FOR ANTITRUST 33
(2018) (“To prevent monopolies and monopsonies from leveraging their power
across markets, the [effective competition] standard would prohibit their vertical
integration into other markets, where the integration may foster the monopolist’s
or monopsonist’s ability and incentives to distort competition.”). For further back-
ground on the Neo-Brandeisian movement, see Lina M. Khan, The New Brandeis
Movement: America’s Antimonopoly Debate, 9 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. & PRAC.
131 (2018); TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE
127–39 (2018) (setting out a “Neo-Brandeisian agenda”).
14. Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century, FED.
TRADE COMM’N, https://ftc.gov/policy/hearings-competition-consumer-protection
[https://perma.unl.edu/7XDP-RYKM] (last visited June 23, 2019).
15. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Division, Justice Department Re-
viewing the Practices of Market-Leading Online Platforms (July 23, 2019), https:/
/www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reviewing-practices-market-leading-
online-platforms [https://perma.unl.edu/E6MY-6YKE].
16. EC Digital Competition Report, supra note 11.
17. AUSTL. COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM’N, DIGITAL PLATFORMS INQUIRY (2019).
18. UK DIGITAL COMPETITION EXPERT PANEL, UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION
133–36; 157–62 (2019) [hereinafter Furman Inquiry Report].
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opening of a market study into digital platforms.19 This Article aims
to contribute to the discussion surrounding platform owners’ activities
in adjacent markets, a focal point of policymakers’ deliberations.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II briefly discusses the rise of
digital platforms and the conduct that critics deplore and places the
debate in context by describing the activity of platform owners active
in online search, mobile operating systems, online marketplaces, and
social media. Part III provides a brief overview of the historical devel-
opment of the leverage doctrine, focusing on U.S. courts’ aversion to
vertical integration and tying arrangements, for which the leverage
doctrine formed the basis. It then analyzes the critique of the leverage
doctrine by scholars associated with the University of Chicago, con-
cluding that the fundamental contribution of the Chicago critique—
that leveraging is predominantly beneficial to consumers—is still rele-
vant today. Thus, antitrust law currently distinguishes pro- from anti-
competitive leverage in order to achieve the optimal balance between
promoting competition in adjacent markets and preserving the legiti-
mate ability of dominant firms to enter and compete in adjacent mar-
kets. Part IV examines the proposals put forward by the scholars who
criticize digital platform firms, including those advocating structural
separation, those calling for non-discrimination regulation, and those
proposing a recast antitrust law under which dominant firms bear a
higher burden of proof. As we shall see, these proposals, to varying
degrees, abrogate consumer welfare in favor of “small business wel-
fare” and would sweep the rug from under the existing framework
that, some would argue, already strikes the correct balance between
the ability of dominant firms to enter adjacent markets and the sur-
vival of small businesses in those markets. Ultimately, the recommen-
dations of these scholars depend on empirical criteria that have not
been verified, including platform owners’ strategic bottleneck power
over distribution in adjacent markets, evidence of widespread compet-
itive harms in adjacent markets, discernible product boundaries, and
an unimportance or relative infrequency of integrative efficiencies
that benefit consumers. Unless these criteria are empirically verified,
the status quo, which considers the benefits consumers receive from
leveraging and adjacent market entry, should prevail.
This Article focuses largely on the position in the U.S. However, it
is useful where appropriate to draw on cases and commentary from
the EU and other jurisdictions where there has been more enforce-
ment in recent times.
19. Press Release, Competition & Markets Authority, CMA Launches Digital Mar-
kets Strategy (July 3, 2019), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-launches-
digital-markets-strategy [https://perma.unl.edu/2G2L-ZSYS].
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II. LEVERAGING BY DIGITAL PLATFORM OWNERS
A. Leveraging Concerns in Digital Markets
Firms operating in the digital economy often operate platforms
composed of software code that connect users in a single group to each
other, or users in one group to users in other groups.20 The “network
effects” that characterize platform markets can lead to rapid horizon-
tal growth and, all else equal, a single firm that serves as the standard
for all users to settle on.21 As a result, in the real world platform mar-
kets are frequently concentrated with a few firms serving consumer
demand. Platform operators also often grow vertically by adding new
features to their platforms to make them more attractive to users
(and, where applicable, third-party distributors). This is especially
true when platform markets are in their incipiency: a diligent plat-
form firm will enter adjacent markets to attract users to the platform,
which will then attract third parties to distribute their products
through the platform, which will in turn attract more users, and so on.
This can serve to solve the so-called “chicken-and-egg” problem that
bedevils nascent platform business models.22 For a platform to sur-
vive, it must be attractive to both consumers and third-party distribu-
tors; thus, hampering innovation within the platform ecosystem could
destroy the platform value entirely.23 Choosing to enter a complemen-
tary line of business already served by third-parties is therefore a
complex strategic decision for any platform owner, fraught with trade-
offs. Nonetheless, scholars have concluded that platform owners
predominantly have the incentive to encourage innovation by produc-
ers of complements, as this increases platform value.24
However, once a particular platform market matures, third-party
producers can theoretically become reliant on the platform to dis-
tribute their products. Some scholars are critical of GAFA’s practice of
entering adjacent lines of business served by independent vendors and
leveraging the popularity of their platforms to direct consumers to-
20. See, e.g., Richard Schmalensee & David S. Evans, Markets with Two-Sided Plat-
forms, in 1 ISSUES IN COMPETITION L. AND POL’Y 667 (2009).
21. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8
J. ECON. PERSP. 93 (1994).
22. See Andrei Hagiu & Daniel Spulber, First-Party Content and Coordination in
Two-Sided Markets, 59 MGMT. SCI. 933, 935 (2013) (finding that the provision by
platforms of first-party content “enable[s] platforms facing unfavorable expecta-
tions to compensate for their difficulty in attracting third-party sellers.”).
23. Annabelle Gawer & Rebecca Henderson, Platform Owner Entry and Innovation
in Complementary Markets: Evidence from Intel, 16 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY
1, 2 (2007).
24. Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open
Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the In-
ternet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85 (2003).
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wards their own adjacent offerings. As Lina Khan, a vocal critic of
digital platform owners, writes:
[P]latforms not only serve as critical infrastructure, but are also integrated
across markets. This enables a platform to leverage its platform dominance to
establish a position in a separate or ancillary market. By placing a platform in
direct competition with the firms using its infrastructure, this form of integra-
tion also creates a core conflict of interest, incentivizing a platform to privilege
its own goods and services over those offered by third parties.25
This concern has been characterized as one entity serving as both
“player” and “referee” on the platform. Allegedly, this dual role creates
an irreconcilable misalignment between the interests of users, third
party distributors, and the platform owner itself. Margrethe Vestager,
European Competition Commissioner, has described how firms that
act as “both player and referee, competing with others that rely on the
platform, but also setting the rules that govern that competition,” is
“one of the biggest issues we face.”26 Elizabeth Warren, who has ar-
gued in favor of breaking GAFA up as part of her presidential cam-
paign, claims that “you don’t get to be the umpire and have a team in
the game.”27 Despite its vague, somewhat rough-hewn application to
real-world scenarios, the player-referee paradigm has picked up steam
as a digestible appellation that ostensibly sums up the leveraging is-
sue. Going forward, it is important that all sides of the debate have a
firm grasp on the law and economics of leverage, so that the player-
referee label of the twenty-first century does not befall the same fate
as “leverage” did in the preceding century.
While this Article takes as given the presence of a platform owner
in one or more adjacent markets, much of the debate revolves around
whether that firm should be able to enter the adjacent market in the
first place, either through natural growth or merger. Thus, while this
Article focuses on single-firm conduct under § 2 of the Sherman Act
(and its European counterpart, Article 102 of the Treaty on the Func-
25. Lina M. Khan, What Makes Tech Platforms So Powerful?, PRO-MARKET (Apr. 5,
2018), https://promarket.org/makes-tech-platforms-powerful/ [https://perma.unl
.edu/HZ4W-B8CD]. See also Lina M. Khan, The Ideological Roots of America’s
Market Power Problem, 127 YALE L.J.F. 960, 961 (2018) (arguing that “a few tech-
nology platform companies mediate a rapidly growing share of our commerce and
communications” and that “these firms leverage their platform power into new
lines of business, extending their dominance across sectors.”).
26. Margrethe Vestager, Competition and the Digital Economy, speech at Associa-
tion of European Competition Law Judges Annual Conference (June 6, 2019).
27. Alexander C. Kaufman, Elizabeth Warren on Breaking up Amazon: ‘You Don’t
Get To Be The Umpire And Have A Team’, HUFF. POST (Apr. 22, 2019), https://
www.huffpost.com/entry/elizabeth-warren-tech-amazon_n_ 5cbe6120e4b00b3e70
ce32b8 [https://perma.unl.edu/A9EH-4K3P]. See also Elizabeth Warren, Here’s
How We Can Break up Big Tech, MEDIUM (Mar. 8, 2019), https://medium.com/
@teamwarren/heres-how-we-can-break-up-big-tech-9ad9e0da324c [https://perma
.unl.edu/H447-G9DJ], at 4 (proposing a prohibition on “owning both the platform
utility and any participants on that platform.”).
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tioning of the European Union (TFEU)), the conclusions drawn in re-
sponse to various policy proposals will axiomatically have important
consequences for merger control policy. Indeed, for those acquisitions
by platform owners that have been scrutinized, leveraging has been a
key theory of harm. For example, the DOJ considered a leveraging
theory of harm when it investigated Google’s acquisition of Admeld in
2011.28 In the EU, leveraging concerns prompted the EC to extract
commitments from Microsoft when it acquired LinkedIn.29 The EC
also considered leveraging theories of harm when it investigated Ap-
ple’s acquisition of Shazam.30
Leveraging underpins past, present, and future merger cases, es-
pecially in digital markets. One oft-cited statistic is that GAFA (plus
Microsoft) have together acquired over 400 businesses in the past dec-
ade (although it is also widely accepted that the vast majority of these
acquisitions have been presumptively pro-competitive).31 For exam-
ple, there is a growing concern that Facebook should not have been
allowed to acquire Instagram or WhatsApp or Google to acquire
Waze.32 The Furman Inquiry Report concluded that merger control in
28. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Division, Statement of the Department
of Justice’s Antitrust Division on Its Decision to Close Its Investigation of Google
Inc.’s Acquisition of Admeld Inc. (Dec. 2, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
statement-department-justices-antitrust-division-its-decision-close-its-investiga-
tion-google [https://perma.unl.edu/9ATJ-KXKC] (noting that the investigation
evaluated whether the acquisition would “enable Google to extend its market
power in the Internet search industry to online display advertising through an-
ticompetitive means.”).
29. Commission Decision, Case M.8124 (Microsoft/LinkedIn) (Dec. 6, 2016), at ¶ 301
(investigating whether “the combination of LinkedIn’s [professional social net-
work (PSN)] services with Microsoft’s PC-based OSs and productivity software
could lead the merged entity to leverage its strong market position from the mar-
kets for PC-based OSs and for productivity software to the market for PSN ser-
vices.”). To clear the merger, Microsoft made a series of commitments for a period
of five years. See ¶¶ 409–21.
30. Commission Decision, Case M.8788 (Apple/Shazam) (Sept. 6, 2018), at ¶ 274
(considering whether Apple would have the incentive to leverage its “position
from music recognition apps to the markets for digital music streaming apps” by,
for example, “denying or degrading access of competing providers of digital music
streaming apps to Shazam’s referral mechanism” or whether the Apple would
have the incentive to integrate “Shazam’s music recognition functionalities
within the Apple Music apps, and at the same time [deny] similar levels of inte-
gration to competing providers of digital music streaming apps.”). Ultimately, the
EC cleared this merger without imposing conditions. Id. at ¶ 349.
31. See, e.g., Furman Inquiry Report, supra note 18, at 91–92 (“In the last decade,
Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft combined have made over 400
acquisitions globally . . . The Panel recognises that the large majority of the ac-
quisitions by large digital companies in recent years have likely been benign or
beneficial for consumers.”).
32. Tim Wu & Stuart A. Thompson, The Roots of Big Tech Run Disturbingly Deep,
N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/06/07/opin
ion/google-facebook-mergers-acquisitions-antitrust.html [https://perma.unl.edu/
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digital markets “needs a reset” and that “the CMA should take more
frequent and firmer action to challenge mergers that could be detri-
mental to consumer welfare through reducing future levels of innova-
tion and competition”.33 This debate is a subset of wider dissension
concerning appropriate levels of vertical merger enforcement gener-
ally.34 Though this Article focuses on the scrutiny of platform owners
that are already active in adjacent markets, it is important to bear in
mind that the policy proposals examined herein also have ramifica-
tions for vertical merger policy.
B. Examples
To place the debate surrounding adjacent market entry and lever-
aging in the digital economy in its proper context, what follows is a
broad overview of practices engaged in by digital platform owners in
various online markets, such as online search, mobile operating sys-
tems, online marketplaces, and social media, that are the subject of
criticism.35
1. Online Search
Google runs a general internet search engine (Google Search),
which accounts for a significant proportion of internet users’ internet
searches across the globe. As well as running a general internet
search engine, Google has also entered several complementary lines of
business, such as mapping services (Google Maps), comparison shop-
ping services (Google Shopping), online job listings, and comparison
flight services (Google Flights). Google’s rivals in these ancillary lines
of business complain that Google leverages the popularity of its gen-
eral internet search engine to grant itself competitive advantages to
its ancillary services. Specifically, Google allegedly grants prominent
display to its adjacent services within its search results pages, which
renders links to rival websites less visible to users, resulting in more
users clicking on the former, rather than the latter. In 2017 the EC
found that this behavior, in the context of comparison shopping ser-
vices, violated Article 102 TFEU.36 Similar complaints have been
86T7-4KRL]; Daniel Trotta, Wall Street Critic Warren Vows to Break up Amazon,
Facebook, Google, REUTERS (Mar. 8, 2019), https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-
election-warren-idUKKCN1QP1M2 [https://perma.unl.edu/5TXP-JMD9].
33. Furman Inquiry Report, supra note 18, at 93.
34. See, e.g., Steven C. Salop, Invigorating Vertical Merger Enforcement, 127 YALE
L.J. 1962 (2018) (proposing more stringent vertical merger enforcement).
35. The following discussion does not make any representations as to the dominance
of the platform owners in their respective platform markets, but merely serves to
exemplify the wide practice of adjacent market entry and leveraging by platform
firms that have been the subject of criticism.
36. Council Regulation 1/2003, 2017 (AT.39740) (EC) [hereinafter Google Shopping];
see also Thomas Hoppner, Duty to Treat Downstream Rivals Equally: (Merely) a
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lodged in relation to Google’s job listings37 and local reviews.38 How-
ever, the FTC closed a similar investigation in 2013, reasoning that
Google’s product designs were adopted “to improve the quality of its
search results” and that “any negative impact on actual or potential
competitors was incidental to that purpose.”39 This is because inte-
grating specialized search results with the general search results
pages provides users with richer content more quickly, economizing on
user search costs.40 In June 2019, it was reported that the DOJ was
readying an investigation into Google, although the specific busi-
nesses and conduct under review are not yet known.41 In September
2019, fifty attorneys general announced that they had launched an
investigation into Google’s advertising and search businesses.42
2. Mobile Operating Systems
Apple and Google produce popular mobile operating system plat-
forms, respectively iOS and Android, and also produce applications
that “sit on top of” those platforms. These applications include music
streaming (Apple Music), mapping services (Apple Maps/Google
Maps), and web-browsing (Safari/Google Chrome). Apple and Google,
Natural Remedy to Google’s Monopoly Leveraging Abuse, 1 EUR. COMPETITION &
REG. L. REV. 208 (2017) (characterizing Google’s conduct as a form of leveraging).
37. Klaus Lauer & Douglas Busvine, Google’s German Jobs Product Anti-competitive,
Says Springer Unit, REUTERS (June 6, 2019), https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-eu-
google-antitrust-axel-sprngr/googles-german-jobs-product-anti-competitive-says-
springer-unit-idUKKCN1T71RM [https://perma.unl.edu/9WWM-GQ2P]; Jon
Porter, Google’s Job Search Tool Faces Complaints from Rivals in Europe, THE
VERGE (Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/13/20803799/google-eu-
ropean-union-job-listing-tool-sites-complaint-competition-commission [https://per
ma.unl.edu/BTR6-WPJE].
38. Rochelle Toplensky & Hannah Kuchler, Yelp Files New EU Complaint Against
Google Over Search Dominance, FIN. TIMES (May 22, 2018), https://www.ft.com/
content/42ac9192-5dd2-11e8-ad91-e01af256df68 [https://perma.unl.edu/CM7G-
3SQ7].
39. Statement of the Fed. Trade Comm’n Regarding Google’s Search Practices, In the
Matter of Google Inc., FTC File Number 111-0163 (Jan. 3, 2013) [hereinafter FTC
Google Statement]. In November 2018, the Brazilian competition authority closed
its investigation into Google’s search practices, reasoning that there was a lack of
evidence that Google’s conduct negatively affected competition comparison shop-
ping services and that users nevertheless benefitted from Google’s conduct. See
Press Release, Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econoˆmica, Superintendeˆncia-
Geral Recomenda Arquivamento de Investigac¸a˜o Contra o Google (Nov. 20, 2018),
http://www.cade.gov.br/noticias/superintendencia-geral-recomenda-arquivamen
to-de-investigacao-contra-o-google [https://perma.unl.edu/J5PY-B5X9].
40. See also John M. Yun, Understanding Google’s Search Platform and the Implica-
tions for Antitrust Analysis, 14 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 311 (2018).
41. Brent Kendall & John D. McKinnon, Justice Department Is Preparing Antitrust
Investigation of Google, WALL ST. J. (June 1, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
justice-department-is-preparing-antitrust-investigation-of-google-11559348795
[https://perma.unl.edu/MUP4-Q8SZ].
42. Kelly, supra note 4.
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through various ways and means, bundle their apps with their
software platforms or with other apps. Some allege that this behavior
stifles competition in the app markets because users exhibit bias to-
wards default options (and having to reach consumers through an app
store is a much less efficient means of reaching consumers). In June
2018, the EC found that Google illegally leveraged between various
mobile application markets by tying some of its Android applications
together in a bundle.43 Specifically, smartphone manufacturers could
not pick and choose between the likes of the Google Play application
store, Google Chrome, or Google Search; if a manufacturer wanted to
pre-install one app, it had to pre-install a whole suite of apps. One
year later, the Competition Commission of India found that similar
conduct amounted to “prima facie leveraging of Google’s dominance”
in India.44
In a similar vein, Apple has been accused of leveraging the popu-
larity of and its control over iOS to increase usage of its various adja-
cent services. In April 2019, the Dutch competition authority
announced that it had commenced an investigation into whether Ap-
ple (potentially along with Google) abused a dominant position by
“giving preferential treatment to its own apps.”45 Echoing the leverag-
ing concerns explored so far, the Dutch authority found that “[o]n the
one hand, Apple and Google have an interest in offering many differ-
ent apps from app providers in their app stores. On the other hand,
however, Apple and Google are app providers in their own right, too.
So their apps compete with those of other market participants.”46 The
authority poses that “[t]hese competing interests may pose antitrust
problems.”47 Also in April 2019, two producers of parental control ap-
plications filed a complaint with the EC alleging that Apple made it
unduly difficult for them to distribute their software through Apple’s
App Store, in order to preference Apple’s Screen Time functionality
(which is integrated with its software platform).48
43. Android Decision, supra note 3.
44. Aditya Kalra, Exclusive: Google Appears to Have Leveraged Android Domi-
nance–India Watchdog, REUTERS (June 28, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/arti
cle/us-google-india-antitrust-exclusive/exclusive-google-appears-to-have-lever
aged-android-dominance-india-watchdog-idUSKCN1TT1Q2 [https://perma.unl
.edu/6PY6-TWNT].
45. Press Release, Authority for Consumers & Markets, ACM Launches Investiga-
tion into Abuse of Dominance by Apple in Its App Store (Apr. 11, 2019), https://
www.acm.nl/en/publications/acm-launches-investigation-abuse-dominance-ap
ple-its-app-store [https://perma.unl.edu/E2YQ-JH5U].
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Press Release, Qustodio, Qustodio & Kidslox File a Complaint Against Apple
with the European Commission over Abuse of Dominant Position (Apr. 30, 2019).
Apple has since adjusted its policies so that parental control app developers can
access technologies in iOS that allow them to operate. See Updates to the App
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On the other hand, technically integrating various apps, which ne-
cessitates tying them together in a bundle and, indeed, giving them
“preferential treatment” relative to third-party apps, can generate ef-
ficiencies that do not prevail if the apps are distributed on a
standalone basis.49 As Carl Shapiro notes, “the boundary between the
‘platform’ and services running on that platform can be fuzzy and can
change over time.”50 Moreover, platforms need to have rules that gov-
ern the negative externalities that certain users or third-parties exert
on other users of the platform in order to maximize the value of the
platform to all users.51 This can involve stymieing the compatibility of
third-party applications with the platform itself. Apple, in a press re-
lease following the parental control app complaint, stated that certain
parental control apps “put users’ privacy and security at risk.”52 Apple
has also invoked this sort of justification as a response to a complaint
that Spotify, the music-streaming service, has made to the EC.53 Spo-
tify claimed that Apple illicitly put Spotify at a competitive disadvan-
tage vis-a`-vis Apple’s own music streaming service within the iOS
platform by levying a 30% commission on subscriptions to Spotify’s
premium ad-free service, blocking certain upgrades to Spotify’s app,
and locking Spotify out of Apple’s other ecosystems, such as Siri,
HomePod, and Apple Watch.54 In response, Apple claimed that it only
rejected Spotify’s app updates when they broke the App Store rules
and that it had supported Spotify’s integration with Airplay 2 (the
streaming technology used in the HomePod and Siri) and Apple
Watch.55 Apple also denied that it takes a 30% cut of Spotify’s sales
made through Apple’s platform, stating that it takes a 15% portion of
subscription fees for less than 1% of Spotify’s subscribers.56
Store Review Guidelines, APPLE (June 3, 2019), https://developer.apple.com/news/
?id=06032019j [https://perma.unl.edu/S89Z-VL84]; Jack Nicas, Apple Backs off
Crackdown on Parental-Control Apps, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2019), https://www.ny
times.com/2019/06/03/technology/apple-parental-control-apps.html [https://per
ma.unl.edu/3AKT-A7TL] (last visited June 29, 2019).
49. See infra subsection III.D.2.
50. Carl Shapiro, Protecting Competition in the American Economy: Merger Control,
Tech Titans, Labor Markets, 33 J. ECON. PERSPS. 69, 84 (2019).
51. David S. Evans, Governing Bad Behavior by Users of Multi-Sided Platforms, 27
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1201 (2012).
52. Press Release, Apple, The Facts About Parental Control Apps (Apr. 28, 2019),
https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2019/04/the-facts-about-parental-control-apps/
[https://perma.unl.edu/32B4-FK4H].
53. Press Release, Spotify, Consumers and Innovators Win on a Level Playing Field
(Mar. 13, 2019), http://newsroom.spotify.com/2019-03-13/consumers-and-innova
tors-win-on-a-level-playing-field/ [https://perma.unl.edu/T3UA-KU92].
54. Id.
55. Press Release, Apple, Addressing Spotify’s Claims, http://apple.com/uk/news
room/2019/03/addressing-spotifys-claims/ [https://perma.unl.edu/4ZHJ-FX9R].
56. Jacob Kastrenakes, Apple Cites Irrelevant Spotify Subscription Stats in New An-
titrust Defense, THE VERGE (June 24, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/6/24/
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3. Online Marketplaces
Amazon is a popular platform that connects users and independent
merchants. However, Amazon is also active in the supply of private
label products (for example, its Amazon Basics range), and thus com-
petes with its merchants in some product lines. In a popular article,
Khan accuses Amazon of “cross-leverag[ing] market advantages
across distinct lines of business” in ways that the current antitrust
framework does not anticipate.57 The European Commission58 and
Italian59 and Luxembourgish60 competition authorities are investigat-
ing Amazon’s activity in this sphere. The German and Austrian au-
thorities closed investigations into Amazon’s treatment of merchants
in July 2019, after securing changes in Amazon’s terms of business
with merchants.61 The Italian authority is investigating whether Am-
azon discriminates against merchants that do not use Amazon’s logis-
tics services. Meanwhile, the EC is investigating whether Amazon is
leveraging the sales data that it collects from its merchants to privi-
18715719/apple-spotify-eu-antitrust-complaint-response [https://perma.unl.edu/
N7EE-ZQ7N].
57. Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 717 (2017).
58. European Commission Press Release IP/42/91, Antitrust: Commission Opens In-
vestigation into Possible Anti-Competitive Conduct of Amazon (July 17, 2019)
[hereinafter EC Amazon Press Release]; see also Margrethe Vestager, Speech at
CEPS Corporate Breakfast: Getting the Best out of Technology (Sept. 10, 2018)
(“[S]ome platforms . . . might collect sensitive data about products that are sold
by others through the marketplace. And they might use that data to boost their
own sales of the same products, at the expense of sellers on the marketplace. So
we’re looking right now to see if there is a real issue here under the competition
rules.”).
59. Press Release, Autorita` Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, Amazon: In-
vestigation Launched on Possible Abuse of a Dominant Position in Online Mar-
ketplaces and Logistic Services (Apr. 16, 2019), https://en.agcm.it/en/media/press-
releases/2019/4/Amazon-investigation-launched-on-possible-abuse-of-a-domi
nant-position-in-online-marketplaces-and-logistic-services [https://perma.unl
.edu/3QPF-AJ98].
60. Press Release, Counseil de la Concurrence, Enqueˆte sur les Services de
Plateforme en Ligne (Apr. 2, 2019), https://concurrence.public.lu/dam-assets/fr/
actualites/2019/2019-4-1-Communique-services-en-ligne-.pdf [https://perma.unl
.edu/L9DT-NXG2] [Google translation]. The exact conduct under investigation is
not yet known, but the authority has invited submissions from retailers that dis-
tribute through Amazon’s platform.
61. In Germany, see Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt Obtains
Far-reaching Improvements in the Terms of Business for Sellers on Amazon’s
Online Marketplaces (July 17, 2019), https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/Shared
Docs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2019/17_07_2019_Amazon.html [https://
perma.unl.edu/XUD9-NA6F] [hereinafter Bundeskartellamt Amazon Press Re-
lease]. In Austria, see Press Release, Bundeswettbewerbsbeho¨rde, BWB in-
formiert: Amazon a¨ndert Gescha¨ftsbedingungen (July 17, 2019), https://www
.bwb.gv.at/news/detail/news/bwb_informiert_amazon_aendert_geschaeftsbeding
ungen/ [https://perma.unl.edu/EQN8-XJGT] [Google translation].
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lege its own offerings.62 When sellers transact with consumers
through Amazon’s platform, Amazon accumulates the associated sales
data and allegedly uses this data to determine which companies’ offer-
ings appear in Amazon’s “Buy Box,” which is displayed prominently
on Amazon. The EC alleges that the Buy Box “seems key for market-
place sellers as a vast majority of transactions are done through it.”63
The FTC is rumored to be gearing up for an investigation into Ama-
zon’s business practices, too.64 The specific conduct to be scrutinized is
unknown, although Joseph Simons, chairman of the FTC, has stated
that Amazon’s favoring of its own products in search results rankings
may be “problematic.”65
Of course, if Amazon’s products (or whichever firm’s products are
displayed most prominently to users) are cheaper or better than those
of rival firms, there is no tractable consumer harm. But critics allege
that Amazon’s conduct may have negative effects in the long run be-
cause dependence on Amazon for distribution may no longer be a via-
ble business model.66 On the other hand, it is prima facie in Amazon’s
interests to have as many merchants distributing through Amazon as
possible, as this increases the value of Amazon as an e-commerce plat-
form. The share of sales that independent merchants account for on its
platform has increased from 30% in 2008 to 58% in 2018, which Ama-
zon puts down to its investment in “the very best selling tools [it] could
imagine and build” for independent merchants.67 Notably, in April
2019 Amazon redesigned its platform interface so that certain promi-
62. EC Amazon Press Release, supra note 58.
63. Id.
64. Tony Romm, Amazon Could Face Heightened Antitrust Scrutiny Under a New
Agreement Between U.S. Regulators, WASH. POST (June 1, 2019), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/06/02/amazon-could-face-heightened-anti
trust-scrutiny-under-new-agreement-between-us-regulators/ [https://perma.unl
.edu/D6UR-PBMF].
65. Richard Waters, US Regulator Says Amazon Search Algorithm May Be ‘Problem-
atic’, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/b724374c-d99a-
11e9-8f9b-77216ebe1f17 [https://perma.unl.edu/VB9W-EERR]. For further back-
ground on this allegation, see Dana Mattioli, Amazon Changed Search Algorithm
in Ways That Boost Its Own Products, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www
.wsj.com/articles/amazon-changed-search-algorithm-in-ways-that-boost-its-own-
products-11568645345 [https://perma.unl.edu/KM77-9NDX].
66. See, e.g., Olivia Solon, As Tech Companies Get Richer, Is It ‘Game Over’ for Star-
tups?, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2017/oct/20/tech-startups-facebook-amazon-google-apple [https://perma.unl.edu/
SHZ2-7BHA] (quoting a source as stating that new startups “are not getting
funded because Amazon might one day compete with them”).
67. Letter from Jeff Bezos, Founder and Chief Executive Officer, Amazon.com, Inc.,
to Shareholders of Amazon.com, Inc. 1 (Apr. 11, 2019), https://ir.aboutamazon
.com/static-files/4f64d0cd-12f2-4d6c-952e-bbed15ab1082 [https://perma.unl.edu/
8GCC-T2CF].
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nent areas (like the top of search results) were no longer devoted
solely to Amazon private-label products.68
4. Social Media
Facebook is primarily a social media platform where users connect
to their friends and family. However, Facebook is also integrated into
various adjacent services, such as local buy-and-sell, video streaming
and job listings. Facebook also facilitates the development of third-
party applications that are built around the Facebook platform and
integrated with it to various degrees. Facebook makes its “Graph” API
available to software developers, which enables them to access an ar-
ray of user-data once users authenticate using their Facebook login
details.69 This expands the range of complementary software products
that can be built around the Facebook ecosystem.
However, Facebook has been accused of excluding some third par-
ties from distributing software applications that rely on Facebook’s
data because “Facebook was looking to offer replica services itself.”70
In one instance, Facebook shut off API access to a developer whose
application scanned users’ photos for bikinis.71 There is an obvious
economic justification for this, namely that facilitating the production
of such an invasive application would reduce the value of the Facebook
platform due to users’ negative reactions and privacy concerns.72 Sim-
ilarly, in December 2018 it came to light that Mark Zuckerberg,
Facebook’s founder and CEO, personally approved blocking the access
of Vine (owned by Twitter) to data that enabled it to provide a friend-
finding feature in its video app.73 Ironically, Twitter has itself been
accused of similar practices. For example, the company raised con-
68. Eugene Kim, Amazon Quietly Removes Promotional Spots that Gave Special
Treatment to Its Own Products as Scrutiny of Tech Giants Grows, CNBC (Apr. 3,
2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/03/amazon-removes-special-promo-spots-
for-private-label-products.html [https://perma.unl.edu/5P2H-J7SN].
69. Graph API, FACEBOOK, https://developers.facebook.com/docs/graph-api [https://
perma.unl.edu/Y8BW-K2G9] (last visited Aug. 29, 2019).
70. Lina M. Khan (@linamkhan), Twitter (June 6, 2018, 1:25PM), https://twitter.com/
linamkhan/status/1004428988851335168 [https://perma.unl.edu/FPR4-QG5N].
71. See Kurt Wagner, Here’s Why an App for Finding Bikini Pics Is Facebook’s Latest
Headache, VOX RECODE (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.recode.net/2018/11/29/18118
369/facebook-six4three-lawsuit-explained-pikinis-sealed-documents [https://per
ma.unl.edu/V5JU-QRJN].
72. On platform owners’ need to regulate bad behaviour within platform ecosystems,
see Evans, supra note 51, at 1201.
73. Adi Robertson, Mark Zuckerberg Personally Approved Cutting off Vine’s Friend-
Finding Feature, THE VERGE (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/12/5/
18127202/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-vine-friends-api-block-parliament-docu
ments [https://perma.unl.edu/2Q43-UQYQ] (last visited June 29, 2019). Accord-
ing to documents seized by a UK parliamentary committee, a Facebook executive
wrote to other senior management personnel, “Twitter launched Vine today,
which lets you shoot multiple short video segments to make one single, 6-second
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cerns among developers in 2015 when it shut off API access to Meer-
kat, a livestreaming application, shortly after Twitter acquired
Periscope, a rival company.74 Earlier, in 2012, Twitter shut off the
access of Instagram (now owned by Facebook) to Twitter’s own
friends-related API.75
In July 2019, Facebook revealed in regulatory filings that it had
become the subject of an antitrust investigation by the FTC in June
2019; as yet, the specific allegations are unknown.76
Separately, Facebook has been accused of “appropriating” function-
ality from competitors. For example, it produced an alternative to
SnapChat’s “Stories” feature and bundled it with Facebook, Facebook
Messenger, and Instagram.77 However, this conduct does not fit
neatly into our framework of a vertically integrated platform privileg-
ing its downstream offering over those of its rivals within the platform
environment. This debate falls properly within the realm of the appro-
priate limits of intellectual property law (which, though a facet of
wider competition policy, is an entirely different beast).
This section has shown that there is a growing debate about the
activities of platform owners such as GAFA in lines of business that
are ancillary to their core offerings. It has exemplified these concerns
by reference to real-life examples. Different stakeholders take dramat-
ically different stances on these issues, as we shall see. This includes
video . . . Unless anyone raises objections, we will shut down their friends API
access today,” to which Zuckerberg responded, “Yup, go for it.”
74. Seth Fiegerman, Twitter’s Meerkat Crackdown Reignites Concerns Among Devel-
opers, MASHABLE (Mar. 16, 2015), https://mashable.com/2015/03/16/twitter-devel-
opers-meerkat-sxsw/?europe=true [https://perma.unl.edu/QM24-3F4F] (last
visited Aug. 29, 2019).
75. Adi Robertson, Twitter Blocks Instagram From Using its API for Friend-Finding
Feature, THE VERGE (July 26, 2012), https://www.theverge.com/2012/7/26/
3189340/twitter-blocks-instagram-friend-finding-api [https://perma.unl.edu/
HC6Q-CNX6] (last visited Aug. 29, 2019).
76. Facebook Reports Second Quarter 2019 Results, FACEBOOK (July 24, 2019), https:/
/s21.q4cdn.com/399680738/files/doc_financials/2019/Q2/FB-Q2-2019-Earnings-
Release.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/789V-6WBJ]. According to one report, the al-
legations concern Facebook’s acquisition strategy. See Brent Kendall, John D.
McKinnon & Deepa Seetharaman, FTC Antitrust Probe of Facebook Scrutinizes
Its Acquisitions, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ftc-anti-
trust-probe-of-facebook-scrutinizes-its-acquisitions-11564683965 [https://perma
.unl.edu/FN4Z-WV9A].
77. Interview by Joe Nocera with Hal Singer, Managing Director at Econ One Re-
search and Adjunct Professor at McDonough School of Business, Georgetown
University (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/on-small-
business/how-to-fix-big-tech-without-breaking-it-up/2019/03/22/bc19eeee-4ca6-
11e9-8cfc-2c5d0999c21e_story.html [https://perma.unl.edu/V6T4-52QV]
(“[Facebook] go around and figure out what you do outside of Facebook, and if you
spend too much time outside, they have their engineers copy the functionality of
an independent app and bring it into the mothership. Snapchat is the classic
example.”).
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those who believe that antitrust law, as influenced by the Chicago
School’s consumer welfare framework, is perfectly capable of tackling
anti-competitive leverage in the digital economy. The next Part exam-
ines the treatment of adjacent market entry and leveraging in anti-
trust law.
III. LEVERAGING IN ANTITRUST LAW
A. The Historical Origins of the Leverage Doctrine
In the first half of the twentieth century, antitrust law was over-
whelmingly opposed to both vertical integration and leveraging con-
duct (which, as discussed in the Introduction, are distinct
phenomena). As Professor Herbert Hovenkamp points out, antago-
nism towards vertical integration rose from “the Great Depression,
which bankrupted thousands of small unintegrated firms and pro-
duced a political firestorm of campaigning against vertically inte-
grated enterprises such as chain stores.”78 By the late 1930s and
1940s, vertical integration was seen as “inherently monopolistic.”79 In
an infamous 1962 decision, the Supreme Court blocked a vertical
merger where neither firm had a market share sufficient to demon-
strate market power.80 In the Court’s reasoning, the leverage doctrine
took center stage. The Court held that
[t]he primary vice of a vertical merger or other arrangement tying a customer
to a suppler is that, by foreclosing the competitors of either party from a seg-
ment of the market otherwise open to them, the arrangement may act as a
‘clog on competition,’ which ‘deprive[s] . . . rivals of a fair opportunity to
compete.’81
This tendency to conflate adjacent market entry with the ability
and incentive to engage in anti-competitive leverage is important, not
least because the idea that vertically integrated firms will, without
more, have the ability and incentive to leverage anti-competitively is
the central hypothesis underpinning Neo-Brandeisians’ proposal to
block adjacent market entry by digital platform owners.
Leverage as a theory of abuse of monopoly power, though originally
founded in patent law,82 was first applied in an antitrust setting by
78. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Robert Bork and Vertical Integration: Leverage, Foreclo-
sure, and Efficiency, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 983, 988 (2014).
79. Id. at 989.
80. Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
81. Id. at 323–24 (citations omitted).
82. See Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 53 (1912) (White, C.J., dissenting) (hold-
ing that a patentee of a machine that fastened buttons onto shoe-holders should
be prohibited from selling the machine on the condition that purchasers also buy
the patentee’s wire for the machine, because it would enable the patentee “to
extend his patent rights so as to bring within the claims of his patent things
which are not embraced therein” and thereby “multiply monopolies”); Motion Pic-
ture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517–18 (1917) (holding
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Justice Louis Brandeis in the 1931 judgment of Carbice Corp. of Am.
v. Patents Dev. Corp.83 The defendant, which held a patent over a re-
frigeration container, compelled purchasers of its container to also buy
its unpatented dry ice. Giving the majority opinion, Justice Brandeis
held that such licensing restrictions “were beyond the legitimate scope
of [the patentee’s] monopoly” and thus were illegal under the patent
misuse doctrine.84 Justice Brandeis also held, albeit obiter, that the
conduct constituted “a direct violation of the Anti-Trust Acts.”85 In
subsequent antitrust cases, the Supreme Court applied the leverage
doctrine in its ratio decidendi. In 1936, in Int’l Bus. Machs. v. United
States, IBM tied86 the purchase of its business machines to the sale of
punch cards.87 The Supreme Court condemned the arrangement,
holding that it served to “create a monopoly in the production and sale
of tabulating cards suitable for [IBM’s] machines.”88 In 1947, in Int’l
Salt Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court found that that the tying
of unpatented salt to patented salt machines constituted violations of
§ 1 Sherman Act and § 3 Clayton Act.89 Justice Jackson, in his major-
ity opinion, held that the legal “limited monopoly” inherent in the pat-
ents conferred “no right to restrain use of, or trade in, unpatented
salt.”90 The effect of the tying arrangement was to “close [the] market
for salt against competition,” which constituted “a restraint of trade
for which [the patentee’s] patents afford[ed] no immunity from the
anti-trust laws.”91 Two years later, in 1949, the Supreme Court fa-
mously decreed that “tying agreements serve hardly any purpose be-
that exploiting market power to force the sale of unpatented products would en-
able the patentee to “create a monopoly in the [adjacent market] wholly outside of
the patent in suit and of the patent law as we have interpreted it.”). Professor
Herbert Hovenkamp traces the leverage doctrine in patent law back to the case of
Bloomer v. Millinger, 68 U.S. 340, 350 (1863). See Hovenkamp, supra note 78, at
992 (“The [leverage] idea originated in nineteenth century decisions developing
the ‘first sale,’ or patent exhaustion doctrine, which postulated that by imposing
restraints on a patented good after it was sold, a patent holder could leverage its
position to extract revenues beyond what the Patent Act authorized. In its 1863
decision Bloomer v. Millinger, the Supreme Court held that patentees ‘are enti-
tled to but one royalty for a patented machine.’ This ‘double royalty’ or ‘leverag-
ing’ critique has been a prominent part of first sale jurisprudence ever since.”).
83. Carbice Corp. v. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931).
84. Id. at 31–32.
85. Id. at 34 n.4.
86. A tying arrangement, or tie-in sale, can be defined as “an agreement by a party to
sell one product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a differ-
ent (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product
from any other supplier.” N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1958).
87. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
88. Id. at 136.
89. Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
90. Id. at 395–96.
91. Id. at 396.
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yond the suppression of competition.”92 For the Court, the “essence of
illegality in tying agreements [was] the wielding of monopolistic
leverage.”93
The Supreme Court zealously applied the leverage doctrine
throughout the twentieth century, holding that tying arrangements
were per se illegal with scant room for business justification. In Fort-
ner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., for example, the Su-
preme Court held that tying arrangements “deny competitors free
access to the market for the tied product not because the party impos-
ing the tying requirements has a better product or a lower price, but
because of his power or leverage in another market.”94 This reveals an
inherent presumption in the leverage doctrine that there were no pro-
competitive motivations for tying arrangements. Prominent antitrust
scholars agreed with the premise of the leverage doctrine, concluding
that “tying tends to spread market power into markets where it would
not otherwise exist.”95 Indeed, the intuition is easy to grasp and at-
tractive to swallow: naturally, “two monopolies are better than one.”96
B. The Chicago Critique of the Leverage Doctrine
It was not until the 1950s that scholars in law and economics asso-
ciated with the University of Chicago started to question the veracity
of the leverage doctrine and the per se illegality of tying, vertical merg-
ers, and other leveraging behavior.97 Perhaps the most famous Chi-
cago insight was the idea that a monopolist could not earn additional
monopoly profits in an adjacent market by leveraging into it (the “sin-
gle monopoly profit theorem”). Take the markets for Product A (mo-
nopolized) and Product B (perfectly competitive). Chicago scholars
pointed out that the monopolist is already charging a profit-maximiz-
ing price for Product A. If the monopolist ties Products A and B to-
gether, assuming that Products A and B are used in fixed proportions,
the consumer would regard any increase in the price of Product B
92. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305 (1949); see also Int’l Salt,
332 U.S. at 396 (“[T]he tendency of the [tying] arrangement to accomplishment of
monopoly seems obvious.”).
93. Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953).
94. See, e.g., Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 498–99
(1969) (emphasis added).
95. CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS 157 (1965).
96. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 174 n.8 (1976).
97. Aaron Director is often credited as the original proponent of the Chicago critique,
and numerous subsequent critics were students of Director at the University of
Chicago Law School. Id. at 173. Director’s only published reference to his critique
of leverage appears in Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future:
Trade Regulation, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 281 (1956). However, scholars have pointed
out that the Chicago critique was understood years prior to its wider dissemina-
tion. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 5, at 518 n.12.
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above the competitive level as an increase in the entire package, and
thus demand and profits would fall below the monopolist’s optimal
level.98 The monopolist therefore has no incentive to leverage into the
market for Product B in order to make that market less competitive.99
Chicago scholars applied this theorem to undermine antitrust law’s
hostility towards both vertical integration and leveraging behavior,
such as tying arrangements.100
Instead, as the Chicago scholars pointed out, vertical integration
and leveraging conduct are predominantly motivated by efficiency, re-
sulting in higher quality or lower prices than prevail if, in the case of
vertical integration, two firms enter into a contract, or, in the case of
leveraging, the primary good is combined with a third-party comple-
mentary good. Chicagoans’ central criticism of Supreme Court case
law was that the conduct concerned should in fact be legal, even if it
excludes competitors in the adjacent market, because consumers ben-
efit from the introduction of product improvements and lower
prices.101 It is not the goal of antitrust law to protect less efficient
producers of the adjacent good from the natural forces of competition,
even if it means that an existing monopolist becomes a monopolist
over another product too. Such a tolerance for unregulated private mo-
nopoly in circumstances where technical considerations, such as supe-
rior efficiency, can elevate successful firms to monopoly status can be
traced through to the neoliberal policy prescriptions of the University
of Chicago’s wider economics and policy scholars, such as Milton
98. Bowman, supra note 6, at 23 (“Where fixed proportions are involved, no revenue
can be derived from setting a higher price for the tied product which could not
have been made by setting the optimum price for the tying product.”).
99. See POSNER, supra note 96, at 173 (explaining that the leverage theory fails to
“explain why a firm with a monopoly of one product would want to monopolize
complementary products as well.”).
100. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 373 (2d ed. 1993) (“The tying arrange-
ment, whatever else it may accomplish, is obviously not a means of gaining two
monopoly profits from a single monopoly.”). In the vertical integration context,
Bork argued that, “[i]f, for example, a firm operates at both the manufacturing
and retailing levels of an industry, it maximizes overall profit by setting the out-
put at each level as though the units were independent of one another . . . The
firm will not, as is frequently suggested, sell to its own retail subsidiary for less
than it sells to outsiders, unless the efficiencies of integration lower the cost of
selling to its own retail unit.” Id. at 228.
101. Chicago scholars also pointed out that, when tied products are used in variable
proportions, tying enables the dominant firm to price discriminate by metering
consumption of the tied product. See POSNER, supra note 96, at 173–74. As Bork
explained, in criticizing International Business Machines, purchasers of IBM’s
machines were in fact “paying for the machines in the price of the cards.” Because
“heavy users are generally willing to pay more than those whose use is less inten-
sive,” IBM could reduce the price of its machines and increase the price of the tied
cards, such that each customer had to “pay a price for the machine in direct pro-
portion to his use of it.” This maximized IBM’s profits through price discrimina-
tion. See BORK, supra note 100, at 377.
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Friedman.102 Thus, while the conduct still constitutes leverage, be-
cause the monopolist has moved from the primary market to the adja-
cent market with a view to gaining market power in the latter market,
it is not anti-competitive because the market power gained is the re-
sult of “superior skill, foresight, and industry.”103 This is pro-competi-
tive leveraging, a form of competition on the merits.104 Consumers are
better off because they benefit from lower prices or higher output or
quality. On the other hand, anti-competitive leveraging occurs when a
monopolist privileges its adjacent product (through tying, exclusive
dealing, etc.) in circumstances where consumers would prefer to deal
with a rival producer in the adjacent market.105 Here, leverage sup-
presses competition without consumer benefits and is properly consid-
ered illegal. Prior to the Chicago critique, this distinction between pro-
and anti-competitive leveraging was ignored by courts in their treat-
ment of leveraging conduct as per se illegal. On the other hand, Chi-
cagoans recognized both the legitimacy of pro-competitive leverage
and the frequency with which it was engaged by firms with and with-
out market power.
C. The Impact of the Chicago Critique on Adjacent Market
Entry and Leveraging
The Chicago critique of the leverage doctrine had a significant im-
pact on antitrust law’s stance on vertical integration. Indeed, the mere
102. According to Friedman, when monopolies arise inevitably because “technical con-
siderations make it more efficient or economical to have a single enterprise . . .
the least of the evils is private unregulated monopoly.” This is because “[d]ynamic
changes are highly likely to undermine” such monopolies, while governmental
intervention is “exceedingly difficult to reverse.” MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM
AND FREEDOM 128 (3d ed. 2002). Friedman later took the extreme position that
antitrust law should be abolished, as its positive effects (promoting competition)
were outweighed by its negative effects (impeding competition due to regulatory
capture). See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CATO INSTITUTE, POLICY FORUM: MILTON FRIED-
MAN ON BUSINESS SUICIDE, 21(1) CATO POL’Y REP. (1999), https://www.cato.org/
policy-report/marchapril-1999/policy-forum-milton-friedman-business-suicide
[https://perma.unl.edu/8P7G-X5T5].
103. United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945); see also United
States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966) (defining illegal monopoli-
zation under the Sherman Act as “the willful acquisition or maintenance of that
power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a supe-
rior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”).
104. O’DONOGHUE & PADILLA, supra note 8, at 251 (describing “[t]he need to distin-
guish procompetitive and anticompetitive leveraging.”).
105. BORK, supra note 100, at 345 (praising the Supreme Court decision in Lorain
Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951), where a monopolist newspaper
company prevented its advertisers from also advertising on local radio. Bork con-
cluded that Lorain Journal was “entirely correct,” reasoning that the defendant
had “an overwhelming market share and a clearly displayed predatory intent.”
Moreover, there was “no apparent efficiency justification for its conduct.”).
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presence of a firm in two related or complementary markets is now
generally considered benign, absent a showing that the firm has the
ability or incentive to engage in predatory or exclusionary conduct.106
As the D.C. Circuit has held, “absent market power, vertical integra-
tion and vertical contracts are procompetitive” because they “en-
courage product innovation, lower costs for businesses, and create
efficiencies—and thus reduce prices and lead to better goods and ser-
vices for consumers.”107 In embracing the fact that “vertical integra-
tion creates efficiencies for consumers,”108 the DOJ and FTC’s 1984
Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines recognize that vertical mergers
“ ‘are not invariably innocuous,’ but instead can generate competitive
harm ‘[i]n certain circumstances.’”109 This stands in stark contrast to
the 1968 Non-Horizontal Guidelines, which espoused the verdict that
vertical mergers “usually raise entry barriers or disadvantage compet-
itors to an extent not accounted for by, and wholly disproportionate to,
such economies as may result from the merger.”110 In reflection of the
sea change that took place in vertical merger policy in the wake of the
Chicago critique, the District of Columbia District Court’s 2018 review
of AT&T’s acquisition of Time Warner constituted the first vertical
merger case that the DOJ had litigated in 40 years, as District Judge
Richard Leon was quick to recognize.111
However, the Chicago critique’s impact on leveraging law and pol-
icy has been relatively mixed, considering that some Chicago scholars,
most notably Robert Bork and Richard Posner, called for per se legal-
ity of tying arrangements.112 On one hand, leveraging by refusing to
106. See, e.g., Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC v. FCC, 717 F.3d 982, 990 (D.C. Cir.
2013) (citing, inter alia, ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 226 (1st ed.
1978) for the proposition that “[v]ertical integration and vertical contracts in a
competitive market encourage product innovation, lower costs for businesses, and
create efficiencies—and thus reduce prices and lead to better goods and services
for consumers.”).
107. Id. (emphasis original); see also Tenneco Gas v. FERC, 969 F.2d 1187, 1201 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (“[A]dvantages a pipeline gives its affiliate are improper only to the
extent that they flow from the pipeline’s anti-competitive market power. Other-
wise vertical integration produces permissible efficiencies that cannot by them-
selves be considered uses of monopoly power.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted); BORK, supra note 100, at 226 (“[V]ertical integration is indispensable to
the realization of productive efficiencies”).
108. Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. FERC, 468 F.3d 831, 840 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
109. United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F.3d 161, 194 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting U.S. Dept.
of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 4.0
(1984)).
110. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Merger Guidelines (1968); accord Hovenkamp, supra note
78, at 990–91.
111. AT&T Inc., 310 F.3d at 193.
112. BORK, supra note 100, at 367 (arguing that it was unjust and erroneous for the
existence of a tie-in sale to constitute “conclusive proof that the seller is wielding
leverage.”); POSNER, supra note 96, at 182 (“The prohibition against tie-in sales
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grant access to an input to one’s competitors (i.e., a refusal to deal) is
“at or near the outer boundary” of antitrust law after the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, LLP, which reaffirmed “the long recognized right of [a] trader
or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to ex-
ercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will
deal.”113 In the same case, the Supreme Court resolved a Circuit
split114 as to whether “monopoly leveraging” constituted a standalone
theory of antitrust harm, debasing the debate by knocking the theory
out in a footnote.115
On the other hand, the influence of the Chicago critique on tying
law was much less successful.116 The Supreme Court did, albeit only
ought to be radically curtailed, and in the absence of a general prohibition of
systematic price discrimination eliminated.”).
113. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
408–09 (2004).
114. Compare Schor v. Abbott Labs., 457 F.3d 608, 611-15 (7th Cir. 2006) (rejecting
“monopoly leveraging” as a standalone theory of anti-competitive harm), In re
Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding
that a monopoly leveraging argument must be “viewed within the framework of a
tying case”), Willman v. Heartland Hosp. E., 34 F.3d 605, 613 (8th Cir. 1994)
(assuming arguendo “that monopoly leveraging is a cognizable section two
claim”), and Advanced Health-Care Servs. Inc. v. Radford Cmty. Hosp., 910 F.2d
139, 149 n.17 (4th Cir. 1990) (reserving judgment as to whether “monopoly lever-
aging is an independent § 2 violation separate from monopolization and at-
tempted monopolization . . . for a case in which the issue is squarely presented.”),
with Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275 (2d Cir. 1979)
(“It is clear that a firm may not employ its market position as a lever to create—
or attempt to create—a monopoly in another market. . . . Berkey . . . contends
that Kodak illicitly gained an advantage in [adjacent markets] by leveraging its
power over film and cameras. Accordingly, we must determine whether a firm
violates § 2 by using its monopoly power in one market to gain a competitive
advantage in another, albeit without an attempt to monopolize the second mar-
ket. We hold, as did the lower court, that it does.”), and Image Tech. Servs., Inc.
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 1997) (interpreting the Su-
preme Court in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451
(1992) as endorsing a monopoly leveraging theory of harm).
115. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 415 n.4 (“[L]everaging presupposes anticompetitive con-
duct, which in this case could only be the refusal-to-deal claim we have re-
jected.”); Four Corners Nephrology Assocs. v. Mercy Med. Ctr., 582 F.3d 1216,
1222 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing Trinko and rejecting a monopoly leveraging theory
where there is no viable claim for anti-competitive conduct like a refusal to deal);
Nicholas Economides, Vertical Leverage and the Sacrifice Principle: Why the Su-
preme Court Got Trinko Wrong, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 379, 407 (2005)
(noting that the Supreme Court in Trinko “dismissed the vertical leveraging
claim based on the fact that it had dismissed the horizontal claim, as if the verti-
cal claim could not stand on its own.”). Nevertheless, the notion of monopoly
leveraging continues to plague the lower courts. See, e.g., Viamedia, Inc. v. Com-
cast Corp., 218 F. Supp. 3d 674, 695-96 (N.D. Ill. 2016).
116. Richard Schmalensee, Thoughts on the Chicago Legacy in U.S. Antitrust, in HOW
THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECO-
NOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 11, 21–22 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008) (noting
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in 2006, depart from the longstanding proposition that tying arrange-
ments “serve hardly any other purpose beyond the suppression of com-
petition.”117 However, the Court did not abandon the “modified per se
illegality” standard that prevails under the Supreme Court ruling in
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde.118 Indeed, circuit courts still re-
fer to the leverage doctrine as the theoretical rationale for the modi-
fied per se rule.119 The Supreme Court confirmed its adherence to the
leverage doctrine in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc.,
noting that the Court had “held many times that power gained
through some natural and legal advantage such as a patent, copy-
right, or business acumen can give rise to liability if ‘a seller exploits
his dominant position in one market to expand his empire into the
next.’”120 In the late 1990s, the DOJ brought its landmark case
against Microsoft for leveraging from the desktop operating system
market to the internet browser market as a means of protecting its
monopoly.121 Interestingly, Bork batted for the complainants.122
that, for tying arrangements, the Chicago School “mainly won in the seminar
room but has made little headway in the courts.”).
117. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 36–45 (2006) (“Many tying
arrangements . . . are fully consistent with a free, competitive market.”).
118. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). In this case, the Su-
preme Court held that it was “far too late in the history of our antitrust jurispru-
dence to question the proposition that certain tying arrangements pose an
unacceptable risk of stifling competition, and therefore are unreasonable ‘per
se.’” Id. at 9. That said, the Court acknowledged that “not every refusal to sell
two products separately can be said to restrain competition.” Id. at 11.
119. See, e.g., Cascade Health Sols. v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 912 (9th Cir. 2008)
(“Tying arrangements are forbidden on the theory that, if the seller has market
power over the tying product, the seller can leverage this market power through
tying arrangements to exclude other sellers of the tied product.”); Town Sound &
Custom Tops v. Chrysler Motors, 959 F.2d 468, 475–76 (3d Cir. 1992) (“The cases
thus reveal a concern that a monopolist in the tying product market may use that
leverage to garner sales in a second market, thereby foreclosing competitors and
monopolizing the formerly competitive tied product market too . . . Although past
cases have also spoken of the evils of foreclosing consumer choice . . . more recent
Supreme Court cases have primarily concerned themselves with that danger
when a seller leverages economic power from one market to another.”); Brokerage
Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 140 F.3d 494, 502 (3d Cir. 1998) (“In a
typical tying case, a seller leverages its market power in the market for the tying
product to require the buyer of the product to purchase an unwanted product in
the tied market, thereby (unlawfully) foreclosing competition in that market.”).
120. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481 n.29 (1992)
(quoting Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953)).
However, subsequent literature suggests that Kodak, which established the
“aftermarket doctrine,” has been limited in scope by lower courts. See, e.g., David
A.J. Goldfine & Kenneth M. Vorrasi, The Fall of the Kodak Aftermarket Doctrine:
Dying a Slow Death in the Lower Courts, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 209 (2004).
121. For an overview of the United States v. Microsoft saga, see WILLIAM H. PAGE &
JOHN E. LOPATKA, THE MICROSOFT CASE: ANTITRUST, HIGH TECHNOLOGY, AND
CONSUMER WELFARE (paperback ed. 2009).
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Furthermore, the Chicago critique has been the subject of criticism
in economic literature, which, starting in the 1990s, sought to rebut
the policy implications of the single-monopoly profit theorem by show-
ing that its assumptions were fragile and unrealistic. For example, if
the adjacent market is subject to scale economies and the primary
good is not required for all uses of the adjacent good, the primary mar-
ket monopolist can, in certain circumstances, have the incentive to
distort competition in the adjacent market and harm consumers in do-
ing so.123 Moreover, a monopolist may have the incentive to leverage
anti-competitively into an adjacent market with the objective of pre-
serving its position in the monopolized market (so-called “defensive
leveraging”).124 This insight is important because often the primary
way of unseating a dominant firm is to start off by entering an adja-
cent market.125
Economic models showing that monopolists may have the incentive
to leverage in the absence of consumer benefits are now widespread
(as one Chicago scholar admits126).127 Indeed, in a popular article,
122. Robert H. Bork, Full Text of Bork’s “White Paper” on DOJ vs. MS, ZDNET (July
29, 1998), http://www.zdnet.com/news/full-text-of-borks-white-paper-on-doj-vs-
ms/100139 [https://perma.unl.edu/6CSV-BPC7] (arguing that Microsoft violated
the Sherman Act by “leverag[ing] the OS . . . asset to make people use IE instead
of Navigator.” However, the case was “not an attack on vertical integration,” nor
was it an “objection to the coupling of [IE] and its Windows operating system.”
The concern was simply Microsoft’s “attempt to preserve its monopoly by destroy-
ing a potential rival.”). This highlights the fact that Bork was willing to adapt his
policy views as the economic understanding of antitrust law progressed. As Bork
wrote, there was “no acceptable theory of harm” in leveraging cases in the “pre-
sent state of knowledge,” but only “plausible theories of the good [tying arrange-
ments] may do.” See BORK, supra note 100, at 80-81. As mentioned in note 105,
Bork agreed that the outcome in Lorain Journal was correct. Bork was therefore
not adverse to illegality for exclusionary conduct that suppressed competition in
an adjacent market without pro-competitive justification.
123. The seminal contribution was made in Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure,
and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837 (1990). See also Dennis W. Carlton &
Michael Waldman, Upgrades, Switching Costs and the Leverage Theory of Tying,
122 ECON. J. 675, 680 (2011) (showing that a primary monopolist can have the
incentive to leverage anti-competitively even when the primary good is required
to use the adjacent good).
124. Feldman, supra note 5. For a formal model, see Dennis W. Carlton & Michael
Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in
Evolving Industries, 33 RAND J. ECON. 194 (2002).
125. Randal C. Picker, Platforms and Adjacent Market Competition: A Look at Recent
History, PRO-MARKET (Apr. 16, 2018), https://promarket.org/platforms-adjacent-
market-competition-look-recent-history/ [https://perma.unl.edu/385R-UPYM];
Declaration of Carl Shapiro at 7, United States v. Microsoft Corp. 87 F. Supp. 2d
30 (D.D.C. 2000) (No. 98-1232) (“[N]etwork monopolies can be very strong, they
are most vulnerable to attack by firms in a strong position in a widely-used com-
plementary product.”).
126. Richard A. Posner, Vertical Restraints and Antitrust Policy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV.
229, 231 n.6 (2005).
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Professor Einer Elhauge proclaimed the “death” of the single monop-
oly profit theorem.128 In addition, Post-Chicago scholars produced
models showing that vertical mergers can, in certain circumstances,
have anti-competitive effects, casting doubt on the Chicago position
that vertical integration should be beyond scrutiny.129 Steven Salop, a
vocal proponent of increased vertical merger enforcement, writes that
it has been the victim of “Chicago School economics and laissez-faire
ideology.”130
However, the fundamental contribution of the Chicago School was
not, in this author’s opinion, the single-monopoly profit theorem,
which is correctly viewed as having little practical utility in analyzing
specific real-world situations (though this is equally true of post-Chi-
cago models). Chicago scholars’ observation that adjacent market en-
try and leveraging are predominantly motivated by efficiency
justifications to the benefit of consumers is far more significant. In
this respect, the Chicago School’s insights had a significant impact on
leveraging cases. In Jefferson Parish, for example, the Supreme Court
recast the test for illegal tying arrangements by explicitly including
for the first time a requirement that the tying and tied goods are “sep-
arate products.”131 This criterion has been recognized as implicitly
baking a gauge for measuring efficiencies from tying two products to-
gether into existing Supreme Court doctrine.132 Furthermore, in Ko-
dak, where Kodak was found to have illegally tied spare parts for its
machines to repair services for its machines, the Supreme Court held
127. See, e.g., Jay Pil Choi & Christodoulos Stefanadis, Tying, Investments, and the
Dynamic Leverage Theory, 32 RAND J. ECON. 52 (2001); Barry Nalebuff, Bun-
dling as a Way to Leverage Monopoly (Yale Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper Series
ES, No. 36, 2004) (on file with author); Barry Nalebuff, Bundling as an Entry
Barrier, 119 Q. J. ECON. 159 (2004); Jay Pil Choi & Doh-Shin Jeon, A Leverage
Theory of Tying in Two-Sided Markets (Ludwig-Maximilians Univ.’s Ctr. for
Econ. Stud. & the Ifo Inst., Working Paper No. 6073, 2016) (on file with author);
Federico Etro & Cristina Caffarra, On the Economics of the Android Case, 13
EUR. COMPETITION J. 282 (2017); Alexandre de Cornie`re & Greg Taylor, Upstream
Bundling and Leverage of Market Power (May 18, 2018) (working paper) (on file
with author) (finding that upstream bundling can reduce rivals’ willingness to
pay slotting fees and enable anti-competitive leverage).
128. See Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Mo-
nopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397 (2009).
129. See, e.g., Janusz A. Ordover, Garth Saloner, & Steven C. Salop, Equilibrium Ver-
tical Foreclosure, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 127 (1990); Michael H. Riordan & Steven C.
Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, 63 ANTITRUST L.J.
513 (1995).
130. Salop, supra note 34, at 1963.
131. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
132. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2001). See infra sub-
section IV.B.3.
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that the defendant’s liability turned “on whether ‘valid business rea-
sons’ can explain [its] actions.”133
Fundamentally, as the Supreme Court has held, the monopoliza-
tion offence under § 2 of the Sherman Act involves “(1) the possession
of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisi-
tion or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen,
or historic accident.”134 From this one can draw three constituent ele-
ments: monopoly power, some “bad act,” and a lack of business justifi-
cation.135 The Supreme Court has also held that “[t]he purpose of the
[Sherman] Act is not to protect businesses from the working of the
market; it is to protect the public from the failure of the market,”136 a
sentiment that appears to place low prices and better products above
the welfare of less efficient firms in the antitrust pecking order. Judge
Frank Easterbrook, more mercilessly, has held that “injuries to rivals
are byproducts of vigorous competition, and the antitrust laws are not
balm for rivals’ wounds.”137 This is because “Congress designed the
Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription.’”138 Applying these
principles to leveraging conduct (whether or not achieved through ty-
ing) would accord with the Chicagoan idea that exclusionary conduct
is not illegal if it results from conduct that benefits consumers, either
through lower prices or higher quality.
D. Efficiency Justifications that Benefit Consumers
The observation that both adjacent market entry and leveraging
can benefit consumers, even if in doing so they harm competing busi-
nesses in adjacent markets, was the fundamental contribution of the
Chicago School. Indeed, even authors of pivotal Post-Chicago models
consider that “the courts should impose a very high hurdle for finding
an antitrust violation on the basis of the leverage argument.”139 This
is due to the fact that leverage behavior is “typically driven by effi-
ciency considerations, and it is difficult for the courts to accurately
133. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483 (1992) (quoting
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 600–05 (1985)).
134. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).
135. See Jonathan B. Baker, Promoting Innovation Competition Through the Aspen/
Kodak Rule, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 495 (1999).
136. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993); see also Brooke
Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993) (hold-
ing that antitrust law exists for “the protection of competition, not competitors.”).
137. Ball Mem. Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1338 (7th Cir.
1986).
138. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (citing BORK, supra note 100,
at 66); see also BORK, supra note 100, at 7 (arguing that the “only legitimate goal
of antitrust is the maximization of consumer welfare.”).
139. Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, Robert Bork’s Contributions to Antitrust
Perspectives on Tying Behavior, 57 J.L. & ECON. 121, 133–34 (2014).
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judge this.”140 In other words, the frequency of pro-competitive lever-
aging far outstrips that of anti-competitive leverage.141 This section
demonstrates that efficiencies achieved through adjacent market en-
try and leveraging are ubiquitous in digital markets.
1. Efficiencies from Adjacent Market Entry
On one hand, there are efficiencies that flow from adjacent market
entry by digital platform owners. Firstly, a platform owner (take an
operating system) that charges a profit-maximizing price would prefer
if downstream firms producing complementary products (take app de-
velopers) charged at cost (i.e., had no market power), so that output
was not restricted even further by the imposition on consumers of
markups at two levels of distribution.142 When the platform owner in-
tegrates into the adjacent market, it can internalize the markup in the
platform or adjacent market (as they are complements), exercising
market power solely in one market. In these circumstances, “both con-
sumers and firms are worse off with successive monopolies than when
there is a single, integrated monopoly.”143 Traditionally, the efficien-
cies generated manifest themselves in the form of lower prices, but
double-marginalization can also lead to better quality (for example,
more intrusive levels of advertising).
Secondly, integrated firms are not subject to the opportunistic
“hold up” behavior that can occur in the price system.144 Say a plat-
140. Id.
141. Keith N. Hylton & Michael A. Salinger, Tying Law and Policy: A Decision-Theo-
retic Approach, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 469 (2001).
142. This phenomenon, known as double-marginalization, has been economic ortho-
doxy for nigh on two-hundred years. See AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO
THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH 103 (Nathaniel T. Ba-
con trans., MacMillan 1927) (1838).
143. CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 9, at 417; see also Joseph J. Spengler, Vertical
Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. POL. ECON. 347 (1950) (arguing that verti-
cal integration is generally pro-competitive due to the elimination of double-
marginalization). But see Glen Weyl, Double Marginalization in Two-Sided Mar-
kets (July 2008) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstractid=1324412 [https://perma.unl.edu/CW7W-84M6] (showing
that vertical integration in two-sided markets may increase prices on the side of
the market that is not subject to integration, focusing on banks and debit-clear-
ing networks); cf. Mie la Cour Sonne, Vertical Integration in Two-Sided Markets
(July 2012) (working paper) (showing similar results, but finding that welfare
increases even when price increases).
144. R. H. COASE, The Nature of the Firm, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 33
(1990) (suggesting that contractual hold-up affects firm boundaries); Benjamin
Klein, Robert G. Crawford, & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropria-
ble Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978);
Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contrac-
tual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (both suggesting vertical integration as a
rational response to contractual hold-up). But see William P. Rogerson, Contrac-
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form owner wants to embed mapping functionality in its platform
software and contracts with a firm that specializes in such functional-
ity. If the platform owner makes specific capital investments in tailor-
ing its platform code to integrate with the third party’s mapping
software, the latter can then (threaten to) hold-up the platform owner
and force it to increase the price it pays to license the mapping func-
tionality, a cost that the platform owner will pass onto consumers. In-
tegration into mapping functionality both solves this problem and
serves as a threat to other suppliers that would otherwise engage in
this sort of opportunistic post-contractual behavior.
Lastly, there may also be economies of scope or distribution that
render a platform owner the most efficient producer of the adjacent
product. The platform owner may invest in and develop certain pieces
of software that can form the basis of multiple adjacent applications,
lowering the cost of developing the latter.145 Non-duplication of func-
tionality can also improve performance.146 Comparably, a platform
owner’s knowledge of software development, gained through the de-
velopment of its core platform, can render it the most cost-effective
producer of complementary components. If the platform owner can
produce both the platform itself and a component for the platform at a
lower cost than would prevail if a third party produced the component,
consumers will benefit from lower prices and better quality.
Notwithstanding the above, to justify a less interventionist ap-
proach to adjacent market entry than existed prior to the influence of
the Chicago School, it is insufficient to show that there are potential
efficiencies—this must be supported by evidence that efficiencies oc-
cur frequently relative to anti-competitive harms. This view garners
support from economic scholarship, in which there is a consensus that
“[a] general presumption that vertical integration is pro-competitive is
warranted by a substantial economics literature identifying efficiency
benefits of vertical integration, including empirical studies demon-
strating positive effects of vertical integration in various indus-
tries.”147 As Lafontaine and Slade found in their literature review,
“under most circumstances, profit-maximizing vertical-integration de-
cisions are efficient, not just from the firms’ but also from the consum-
tual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 777 (1992) (arguing
that optimal contractual solutions to the hold-up problem generally exist).
145. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Bundling can
also capitalize on certain economies of scope. A possible example is the ‘shared’
library files that perform OS and browser functions with the very same lines of
code and thus may save drive space from the clutter of redundant routines and
memory when consumers use both the OS and browser simultaneously.”).
146. Id.
147. Michael H. Riordan, Competitive Effects of Vertical Integration, in Handbook of
Antitrust Economics 48 (Paolo Buccirossi ed., 2008).
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ers’ points of view.”148 In a recent literature update, scholars of the
Global Antitrust Institute found “continued support for the conclusion
that vertical mergers and contractual restraints are generally procom-
petitive or competitively neutral.”149
2. Efficiencies from Leveraging
On the other hand, there are efficiencies that stem from both adja-
cent market entry and leveraging conduct that privileges the platform
owner’s adjacent products within the platform ecosystem.
For example, there may be some added benefit of technically inte-
grating two products to some degree that cannot be achieved through
contracting in the price system or simply bolting one product onto an-
other. Integrating Product A (the platform) and Product B (a new com-
ponent) can create some new functionality in the form of Product C
that users value and, crucially, could not achieve by combining Prod-
ucts A and B themselves (from one or multiple firms).150 For example,
Apple produces voice-assistant technology and mapping functionality
and incorporates them with the rest of iOS and other applications to
produce a more seamless user experience.151 In a similar vein, the UK
CMA, in approving Google’s acquisition of Waze, was spurred in part
by the fact that “[i]ntegration of a map application into the operating
system creates opportunities for operating system developers to use
their own or affiliated services (for example search engines and social
networks) to improve the experience of users.”152 These integration
efficiencies are beneficial both to users and third party distributors
(such as app developers), who can depend upon certain functionalities
forming part-and-parcel of the platform’s substrata, and do not there-
148. Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Vertical Integration and Firm Bounda-
ries: The Evidence, 45 J. ECON. LIT. 629, 680 (2007); see also James C. Cooper et
al., Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference, 23 INT. J. INDUS. ORG. 639
(2005).
149. Global Antitrust Institute, Competition and Consumer Protections in the 21st
Century, Vertical Mergers: Hearing Before the Fed. Trade Comm’n (2018).
150. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding that
“an ‘integrated product’ is most reasonably understood as a product that com-
bines functionalities (which may also be marketed separately and operated to-
gether) in a way that offers advantages unavailable if the functionalities are
bought separately and combined by the purchaser.”).
151. Patrick F. Todd, Out of the Box: Illegal Tying and Google’s Suite of Apps for the
Android OS, 13 EUR. COMPETITION J. 62, 85 (2017) (“Apple’s iOS comes pre-in-
stalled with its Maps app, which, over time, has become more fully integrated
with the underlying OS as well as interoperating better with Apple’s other pre-
installed apps. Asking Siri (Apple’s pre-installed virtual assistant) for directions
to a specific location immediately reverts the user to Apple Maps. Creating a loca-
tion-specific event in iCal (Apple’s pre-installed calendar) allows the user to re-
ceive notifications about travel-time (again using Maps).”).
152. Office of Fair Trading, Completed Acquisition by Motorola Mobility Holding
(Google, Inc.) of Waze Mobile Limited, 2013, ME/6167/13, ¶ 28 (UK).
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fore need to replicate that functionality in their own products or
services.153
There are many other potential pro-competitive justifications for
leveraging. For example, distributing together or technically integrat-
ing two products can protect the platform owner’s reputation by en-
suring that it is not unduly punished for malfunctions that occur when
the platform is combined with a substandard adjacent good.154 This
explains why Apple bundles its own applications with its mobile OS
and has strict rules for third-party application developers that dis-
tribute through Apple’s App Store. Moreover, software integration can
decrease consumer search costs by providing them with functionality
or end results that they seek more quickly and efficiently. In 2016 the
High Court of England and Wales (which follows EU competition ju-
risprudence) found that Google was justified in incorporating Google
Maps into its search results pages in response to geographical search
queries.155 The Court took as its starting point the consumer-focused
standard that dominant firms are “able, and indeed should be en-
couraged, to compete” in adjacent markets even if doing so “may ulti-
mately exclude competitors.”156 The Court concluded that any
advantage that the conduct gave to Google Maps, which was not given
to Google’s mapping rivals, was justified because (a) users benefitted
from the incorporation of mapping results generally, and (b) Google
Maps had certain features that rival mapping services did not
have.157 Thus, the incorporation of Google Maps into Google’s search
results pages constituted a form of “competition on the merits.”158
Consumers would clearly be worse off if, in these circumstances,
Google were forced to incorporate less efficient mapping services into
its search results instead of or as well as its own, or unbundle map-
ping services from its search results entirely (although those rivals
would of course benefit enormously).
Of course, it is generally plausible that firms can be motivated by a
desire to stifle competition in adjacent markets and extend market
power in order to increase profits. The assumption of antitrust juris-
prudence prior to the Chicago School’s influence was that anti-compet-
itive leveraging was the only, or at least the most recurrent,
153. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 93 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding, in the
context of Microsoft tying Internet Explorer to Windows, that “the bundling of a
browser with [operating systems] enables independent software developers to
count on the presence of the browser’s APIs, if any, on consumers’ machines and
thus to omit them from its own package.”).
154. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 6, at 27–29; J. Gregory Sidak, Do Free Mobile Apps
Harm Consumers?, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 619, 629 (2015).
155. Streetmap.eu Ltd. v. Google Inc. [2016] EWHC 253 (Ch) (Roth J.) (Eng.).
156. Id. at ¶ 62.
157. Id. at ¶¶ 117–18.
158. Id. at ¶ 116.
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explanation for tying, bundling, and other forms of leveraging con-
duct. Post-Chicago economic models verified that leveraging can be
anti-competitive, but that it can also be pro-competitive. Even though
anti-competitive concerns can theoretically arise, it remains the case
that, empirically, leverage is predominantly motivated by efficiency
justifications.159 This relative frequency in favor of pro-competitive
adjacent market entry and leveraging entails that per se rules against
such conduct were unjustified, and that evidence-based enforcement
should prevail going forward.
E. Distinguishing Anti-Competitive from Pro-Competitive
Leveraging
Under a consumer welfare standard, dominant firms can grant ad-
vantages to their own adjacent products, even if this hampers rival
firms’ ability to compete in the adjacent market, when the efficiencies
generated benefit consumers. This is tolerated—indeed, lauded—even
if less efficient rivals in adjacent markets are excluded. As the Second
Circuit has held, “an integrated business [does not] offend the Sher-
man Act whenever one of its departments benefits from association
with a division possessing a monopoly in its own market.”160 The ben-
efits that accrue to integrated firms, namely “more efficient produc-
tion, greater ability to develop complementary products, reduced
transaction costs, and so forth . . . cannot by themselves be considered
uses of monopoly power.”161 Unlike in the pre-Chicago world, where
there was a general belief that vertical integration and leveraging
were without redeeming features, and thus a per se ban on such con-
duct was (ostensibly) justified, a consumer welfare standard recog-
nizes that leveraging can have both beneficial and harmful effects.162
159. David S. Evans & Michael A. Salinger, Why Do Firms Bundle and Tie? Evidence
from Competitive Markets and Implications for Tying Law, 22 YALE J. ON REG.
37, 40 (2005). (“[C]asual empiricism suggests that efficiencies must be the major
explanation for tying: tying is common in competitive markets and therefore can-
not result mainly from foreclosure or from price discrimination.”); Stan J.
Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Bundles of Joy: The Ubiquity and Efficiency of
Bundles in New Technology Markets, 5 J. COMPETITION L. ECON. 1, 3 (2008)
(“[B]undling not only occurs under some competitive conditions, but it is perva-
sive in the economy and is the dominant form of sales, for reasons that have to do
with efficiencies of a simple and obvious nature: most goods are bundles.”).
160. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275 (2d Cir. 1979).
161. Id.; see also AD/SAT v. Associated Press, 181 F.3d 216, 231 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[I]t is
not unlawful for an existing firm, entering a new product market, to promote its
product by touting the benefits afforded by that product’s association with the
firm. Nor it is unlawful for employees of one division of a firm to promote prod-
ucts produced by another division.”).
162. Judge Easterbrook goes one step further, holding that “the search for the rare
situation in which that [adjacent] monopoly just might allow the firm to gain a
profit by injuring consumers is not worth the candle.” He continued, “The search
itself (and the risk of error in the judicial process) has much more chance of con-
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Moreover, because the beneficial effects of vertical integration and
leveraging are ubiquitous compared to their anti-competitive effects, a
consumer welfare standard should pay due regard and deference to
defendants’ efficiency justifications.163
Take, for instance, United States v. Microsoft.164 Though only a cir-
cuit court judgment, it is reflective of the consumer welfare standard
as applied to leveraging conduct and clearly forms the basis of the
DOJ’s enforcement priorities in this sphere.165 Microsoft held a mo-
nopoly position in the market for desktop OSs. Its monopoly power
came under threat from Netscape’s Navigator web-browser, which al-
lowed developers to create applications without incurring the cost of
porting them to other OSs. Microsoft believed that developers would
flock to write for Navigator instead of Windows, which would under-
mine Microsoft’s dominant position in the OS market. In response,
Microsoft bundled its own web-browser, Internet Explorer (IE), with
Windows and took various strategic steps to deter users from
downloading and original equipment manufacturers from pre-loading
Netscape on Windows computers. Microsoft leveraged its monopoly
position, thereby “sabotage[ing] a nascent technology that might com-
pete with [Windows] but for its foreclosure from the market.”166
The D.C. Circuit applied a rule of reason to Microsoft’s conduct,
meaning that Microsoft could offer “a nonpretextual claim that its con-
duct is indeed a form of competition on the merits because it involves,
for example, greater efficiency or enhanced consumer appeal.”167
Though purporting to engage in balancing under the rule of reason to
assess the legality of Microsoft’s conduct, the D.C. Circuit in fact did
not do any balancing.168 The D.C. Circuit condemned Microsoft for
demning a beneficial practice than of catching a detrimental one.” Schor v. Abbott
Labs., 457 F.3d 608, 613 (7th Cir. 2006).
163. Hylton & Salinger, supra note 141.
164. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
165. Kadhim Shubber, US Antitrust Chief Signals Comfort with Tech Deals, FIN.
TIMES (July 12, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/2e6e1f90-8558-11e8-a29d-
73e3d454535d [https://perma.unl.edu/E83K-TJAB].
166. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 51 n.6 (D.D.C. 2000) (quoting
III PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1746.1d at 495
(Supp.1999)).
167. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 59.
168. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Balancing, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 369, 371–72
(2016) (noting that the D.C. Circuit in Microsoft “decided that case with almost no
balancing . . . .”); Mark S. Popofsky, Defining Exclusionary Conduct: Section 2, the
Rule of Reason, and the Unifying Principle Underlying Antitrust Rules, 73 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 435, 445 (2006) (“[W]hen analyzing Microsoft’s unilateral ‘product de-
sign’ conduct . . . the court, while using the language of comparing effects, in fact
avoided that inquiry.”); A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusionary Conduct Under the
Antitrust Laws: Balancing, Sacrifice, and Refusals to Deal, 20 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1247, 1257 (2005) (noting that the D.C. Circuit “did not actually engage in
market-wide balancing. To the contrary, when it came to deciding the case on the
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those exclusionary acts for which it could offer no justification and ab-
solved Microsoft for those acts for which it did offer a justification.
Such a bifurcated analysis preserves the distinction between pro- and
anti-competitive leverage, achieving an optimal outcome from the per-
spective of consumers.
The FTC’s closure of its investigation into Google’s search practices
is also illustrative of this standard. The FTC found that Google pro-
moted its own adjacent services (such as local search and comparison
shopping) by incorporating them into its search results pages.169 How-
ever, consumers benefitted from this conduct because it enabled
Google to “quickly answer, and better satisfy, its users’ search queries
by providing directly relevant information.”170 The FTC recognized
the potential harm that could be caused by “second-guess[ing] a firm’s
product design decisions where plausible procompetitive justifications
have been offered, and where those justifications are supported by am-
ple evidence.”171
Where platform owners are unable to introduce evidence of plausi-
ble pro-competitive justifications, there is a strong case for interven-
tion once a plaintiff has discharged is burden of showing anti-
competitive effects. This standard fits with Supreme Court doctrine,
which holds that, “[i]f a firm has been ‘attempting to exclude rivals on
some basis other than efficiency,’ it is fair to characterize its behavior
as predatory”.172 On the other hand, where a platform owner can in-
troduce evidence of an efficiency that plausibly benefits consumers, it
will be absolved.
Following the insights of the Chicago School and the consumer wel-
fare framework, antitrust law distinguishes between pro- and anti-
competitive leveraging, condemning the latter but not the former. Due
to the relative prevalence of the former, scholars advocate a deferen-
facts before it, the court did what antitrust courts usually do: it deemed anticom-
petitive only those aspects of the defendant’s conduct that seemed to make no
business sense except as a means of excluding rivals.”).
169. FTC Google Statement, supra note 39, at 2. Despite its apparent similarity to the
EC’s Shopping case, the FTC investigation’s theory of harm may be more compa-
rable to defensive leveraging, as in Microsoft. See FTC, Memorandum on Google
Inc., File No. 111-0163, at 18–30 (Aug. 8, 2012) (see memo as it appeared on the
Wall Street Journal’s website, The  FTC Report on Google’s Business Practices,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 24, 2015), http://graphics.wsj.com/google-ftc-report/ [https://per
ma.unl.edu/AD5H-E4PH]. The leaked memo shows only every other page.) (alleg-
ing that Google “preferenc[ed] its own vertical content over that of rivals, while
simultaneously demoting rival vertical websites, in order to maintain, preserve,
or enhance its monopoly power in the markets for search and search
advertising.”).
170. FTC Google Statement, supra note 39, at 2.
171. Id.
172. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985)
(quoting BORK, supra note 100, at 138).
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tial standard towards firms’ product design decisions.173 Such an ap-
proach preserves the ability of dominant firms to legitimately compete
and provide consumers with the integrated products that they de-
mand, while condemning anti-competitive conduct that stifles adja-
cent market competition with no consumer benefits. The next section
examines regulatory proposals that would, to varying degrees, dis-
solve the distinction between pro- and anti-competitive leveraging.
IV. ABROGATING CONSUMER WELFARE IN FAVOR OF
SMALL BUSINESS WELFARE
It has long been the case that “the primary purpose of the antitrust
laws is to protect interbrand competition.”174 However, in certain cir-
cumstances, it can be preferable from the perspective of societal wel-
fare to shift the focus from inter-to intra-brand competition. Often,
this is achieved through recourse to regulation or legislative initia-
tives. Take, for example, must-carry provisions imposed on cable oper-
ations or since-repealed net neutrality regulation. In circumstances
such as these, society willingly foregoes the benefits of competition in
the inter-brand market because it has concluded, for one reason or
another, that preserving competition in the intra-brand market is
more important. This can mean tolerating counterfactually higher
prices or reduced quality as a by-product of protecting interests
deemed to be more important, such as maintaining a pluralistic down-
stream market.175 It inevitably also distorts the incentive to innovate
the inter-brand market.176 As the Supreme Court noted in Trinko:
Firms may acquire monopoly power by establishing an infrastructure that
renders them uniquely suited to serve their customers. Compelling such firms
to share the source of their advantage is in some tension with the underlying
purpose of antitrust law, since it may lessen the incentive for the monopolist,
the rival, or both to invest in those economically beneficial facilities.177
173. See, e.g., Dennis Carlton & Michael Waldman, How Economics Can Improve Anti-
trust Doctrine Towards Tie-In Sales: Comment on Jean Tirole’s “The Analysis of
Tying Cases: A Primer”, 1 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 27, 38 (arguing that “great
weight should be given to any plausible efficiency from [tying arrangements]” and
that “efficiencies achieved through physical integration . . . should receive greater
weight than efficiencies achieved through contract.”).
174. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15 (1997).
175. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997) (noting that the inten-
tion of Congress when enacting must-carry obligations for cable companies was
inter alia to “promot[e] the widespread dissemination of information from a mul-
tiplicity of sources.”).
176. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407
(2004); Caves & Singer, supra note 12, at 7 (“[W]ith more enforcement, platform
innovation could decrease due to the reduced incentive for existing or would-be
platforms to invest; for example, a regime that shared the majority of the rents of
incumbent platforms with edge providers or rival platforms could upset
Schumpeterian competition.”).
177. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407.
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Nonetheless, there is a growing belief that such an inversion of the
goals of competition policy is exactly what is needed in digital plat-
form markets. Some commentators speak of a “kill zone” to describe
those markets that small start-ups dare not enter through fear of be-
ing displaced by an existing platform owner.178 As one columnist
writes, “[i]f founders believe that big companies will copy their innova-
tions cheaply and compete them out of the market, they’ll never spend
the time and effort to create those innovations in the first place.”179
The cost of false negatives (i.e., those instances where anti-competi-
tive conduct is erroneously found to be lawful) is said to be high be-
cause the market is less likely to self-correct, as Chicagoans presume.
This is especially true where the adjacent market is characterized by
network effects: a platform owner that illegitimately nudges consum-
ers towards its own adjacent protect could tip the adjacent market in
favor of its product to the exclusion of all other firms.180 This has led
some scholars to conclude that regulatory intervention is necessary to
block all leveraging behavior, whether pro-competitive or anti-
competitive.
Given that antitrust law has landed on a position that consumer
welfare trumps small-business welfare, serious deliberation would be
required before enacting a standard that sacrifices consumer benefits
flowing from adjacent market entry and leverage in order to prop up
less efficient businesses that depend on platforms for distribution.
This section therefore examines the empirical criteria that one would
expect to be verified before re-shifting the focus of antitrust law or
competition policy from inter-platform competition to intra-platform
competition. First of all, it examines various proposals put forward to
regulate platform owners’ activity in adjacent markets, showing that
each one constitutes an abrogation of consumer welfare in favor of the
welfare of similar, less efficient businesses.
178. Noah Smith, Big Tech Sets Up a ‘Kill Zone’ for Industry Upstarts, BLOOMBERG
(Nov. 7, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/amp/opinion/articles/2018-
11-07/big-tech-sets-up-a-kill-zone-for-industry-upstarts?twitterimpression=true
[https://perma.unl.edu/5TXA-BAWM]; cf. Will Rinehart, Is There a Kill Zone in
Tech?, TECH. LIBERATION (Nov. 18, 2018), https://techliberation.com/2018/11/07/
is-there-a-kill-zone-in-tech/ [https://perma.unl.edu/ZK3D-GR67].
179. Id.
180. When EC found that Microsoft had illegally leveraged from the desktop OS mar-
ket to the market for streaming media players, it held that “the abuse ha[d] al-
ready contributed to Microsoft achieving a leading position in [the adjacent]
market,” and the evidence suggested that “the market may already be tipping in
favour of WMP.” See Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft v. Comm’n, 2004, ¶ 1071.
The media player market was characterised by network effects. Id. at ¶ 878.
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A. Proposals to Regulate Adjacent Market Competition
1. Structural Separation
Neo-Brandeisians propose to implement “[s]tructural remedies and
prophylactic bans [to] limit the ability of dominant platforms to enter
certain distinct lines of business.”181 Senator Warren has echoed this
policy in her bid for the U.S. presidency, calling for “large tech plat-
forms to be designated as ‘Platform Utilities’ and broken apart from
any participant on that platform.”182 So too have numerous op-eds.183
In 2018, for example, The Economist floated the idea of “block[ing] big
online firms from offering certain services on top of their platforms
because they might favor them over rival offerings.”184
Under this proposal, Amazon would be unable to act both as an
online marketplace and a seller on its own marketplace, Google would
be unable to act as both a search engine and a mapping provider, and
Apple and Google would be unable to act as both producers of mobile
OSs and apps that run on those OSs. Khan posits that this is the pri-
mary method of “prevent[ing] leveraging and eliminat[ing] a core con-
flict of interest currently embedded in the business model of dominant
platforms.”185
A rule that prohibits adjacent market entry by dominant platform
firms will certainly catch all instances of harmful leveraging, but it
will inevitably also condemn all instances of leveraging that are in
fact beneficial to consumers. Moreover, structural separation would
also condemn efficiencies arising from adjacent market entry that do
not depend on leveraging behavior. As demonstrated in section II.D,
there are many efficiencies that can arise from adjacent market entry
and leveraging that consumers benefit from. Moreover, empirical
analysis demonstrates that these consumer benefits are far more fre-
181. Lina M. Khan, Sources of Tech Platform Power, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 325, 332
(2018).
182. Warren, supra note 27.
183. Nilay Patel, It’s Time to Break up Facebook, THE VERGE (Sept. 4, 2018), https://
www.theverge.com/2018/9/4/17816572/tim-wu-facebook-regulation-interview-
curse-of-bigness-antitrust [https://perma.unl.edu/LJK8-3TPN]; Break up Google,
THE BOSTON GLOBE (June 14, 2018), https://apps.bostonglobe.com/opinion/graph-
ics/2018/06/break-google/ [https://perma.unl.edu/XQ82-N6ZH]; Douglas Rushkoff,
It’s Time to Break up Amazon, FAST COMPANY (June 19, 2017), https://www
.fastcompany.com/40432885/its-time-to-break-up-amazon [https://perma.unl.edu/
W359-WJZ2]; Scott Galloway, Silicon Valley’s Tax-Avoiding, Job-Killing Soul-
Sucking Machine, ESQUIRE (Feb. 8, 2018), https://esquire.com/news-politics/
a15895746/bust-big-tech-silicon-valley/ [https://perma.unl.edu/B8AF-N4VY].
184. How Regulators Can Prevent Excessive Concentration Online, THE ECONOMIST
(June 28, 2018), https://www.economist.com/spectial-report/2018/06/30/how-regu-
lators-can-prevent-excessive-concentration-online [https://perma.unl.edu/WK5K-
Q274].
185. Khan, supra note 181, at 333.
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quent than anti-competitive harms.186 Bruce Owen notes that “pro-
phylactic regulation is not necessary, and may well reduce welfare by
deterring efficient investments,” in circumstances where “[e]mpirical
evidence that vertical integration or vertical restraints are harmful is
weak, compared to evidence that vertical integration is beneficial.”187
This proposal therefore abrogates the consumer welfare standard
that prevails under existing antitrust doctrine. However, Neo-
Brandeisians are apparently not (primarily, at least) driven by the in-
terests of consumers. They instead seek a return to the position that
one goal of antitrust law is to protect “viable, small, locally owned
businesses,” even if this results in “occasional higher costs and
prices.”188 In this era, antitrust law and policy “perpetuat[ed] and
preserv[ed], for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an organiza-
tion of industry in small units which can effectively compete with each
other.”189 This atomistic vision of competition is associated with Jus-
tice Louis Brandeis, who famously championed the idea that “bigness”
is a curse.190
2. Non-Discrimination Principles
Some scholars believe that the existing consumer-welfare standard
fails to adequately protect the competitive process in digital markets
and therefore seek a prohibition on leveraging. This principle is com-
monly referred to as “non-discrimination” or “platform neutrality,” but
both refer to the basic concept that digital platform owners, though
able to enter and compete in adjacent markets, would be prohibited
from granting advantages to their adjacent products by leveraging the
popularity of the platforms themselves.191 Hal Singer and Kevin
Caves propose a tribunal that rivals in adjacent markets could turn to
where dominant platform firms promote their own adjacent products
within the platform infrastructure.192 The objective is to prevent the
situation arising where a platform owner succeeds in an adjacent mar-
ket solely by “privileging” or “self-preferencing” its own product over
186. See supra notes 147–149.
187. Owen, supra note 9, at 381.
188. Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
189. United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945).
190. See Barak Orbach & Grace E. Campbell Rebling, The Antitrust Curse of Bigness,
85 S. CAL. L. REV. 605 (2012). Justice Brandeis is cited as introducing this goal of
“small-business welfare.” See BORK, supra note 100, at 17.
191. Caves & Singer, supra note 12; Frank Pasquale, Testimony Before the Task
Force on Competition Policy and Antitrust Laws of the H. Comm. on the Judici-
ary: Internet Nondiscrimination Principles for Competition Policy Online (2008);
Frank A. Pasquale, Dominant Search Engines: An Essential Cultural & Political
Facility, in THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET,
399 (Berin Szoka & Adam Marcus eds., 2011) (arguing that dominant search en-
gines should be regulated as essential public facilities).
192. See Caves & Singer, supra note 12.
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and above those of its rivals, thus frustrating the natural process of
competition in the adjacent market.193 Singer and Caves would model
their “Net Tribunal” on § 616 of the Communications Act, which bars
multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs) from discrimi-
nating against unaffiliated programming networks when making deci-
sions about content distribution, where the effect is to “unreasonably
restrain the ability of an unaffiliated video programming vendor to
compete fairly.”194
Though framed as a regulatory regime operating in parallel to an-
titrust law, the tribunal would have the effect of supplanting antitrust
in favor of a standard that blocks all leveraging behavior, whether
pro-competitive or anti-competitive. For example, Apple and Google
could still produce both apps and software platforms, but they would
be unable to bundle them together, even if doing so improves the user
experience. Amazon would still be able to act as both a marketplace
and a seller of products, but Amazon would be unable to give preferen-
tial treatment to its own products, even if they are cheaper or better
quality or if there is some other reason why consumers benefit from
seeing Amazon’s home-brand products first. Singer applies the stan-
dard to Google Search thusly:
The standard would prevent Google from limiting its search results for local
doctors or local restaurants to Google-affiliated web properties; instead,
Google would be required to run its PageRank algorithm across the entirety of
the public web for local searches. Under a non-discrimination standard, a ver-
tically integrated Google could discriminate in its organic search results in
every dimension save one—whether the results are affiliated with Google.195
This proposal disregards the distinction between pro-competitive
and anti-competitive leveraging, which allows discrimination based on
affiliation where the resulting product benefits consumers. Think
back to the English case of Streetmap, where Google privileged its
mapping services on its search results pages over and above those of
its rivals. Under non-discrimination regulation, Streetmap could have
obtained an injunction that would have forced Google to display third-
party mapping services at the top of search result pages (despite their
deficiencies) or none at all. This would have harmed consumers in or-
der to prop up less efficient firms, and it is not clear how such inter-
vention would preserve the incentive to innovate when Google had
already produced the best mapping service through competition on the
193. See EC Digital Competition Report, supra note 11, at 66 (defining self-preferenc-
ing as “giving preferential treatment to one’s own products or services, or one
from the same ecosystem, when they are in competition with products and ser-
vices provided by other entities.”).
194. 47 U.S.C. § 536(a)(3) (2012).
195. Hal Singer, Inside Tech’s “Kill Zone”: How to Deal With the Threat to Edge Inno-
vation Posed by Multi-Sided Platforms, PRO-MARKET (Nov. 21, 2018), https://
promarket.org/inside-tech-kill-zone/ [https://perma.unl.edu/346W-PTQU].
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merits. Platform owners can, and do, benefit consumers through the
integration of new functionality into the platform code.196 A standard
that prohibits this behavior therefore abrogates antitrust law’s focus
on consumer welfare.
3. Burden Reallocation
Finally, the EC Digital Competition Report suggests recalibrating
the legal analysis of leveraging conduct by “err[ing] on the side of dis-
allowing potentially anti-competitive conducts, and impos[ing] on the
incumbent the burden of proof for showing the pro-competitiveness of
its conduct.”197 In cases of leveraging into adjacent markets, the re-
port proposes “a presumption in favour of a duty to ensure interoper-
ability.”198 Once a plaintiff establishes that leveraging conduct exists,
the defendant would then bear the burden of showing that this con-
duct did not have long-run anti-competitive effects or that the conduct
had an overriding efficiency rationale.199 Proving that conduct does
not have a long-term impact on competition, may be nigh on impossi-
ble, as it involves proving a negative.200
This proposal can be seen as bringing non-discrimination in by the
back door and would return antitrust law to form-based rules that
neglect the actual effects of conduct on competition or consumers. In
the EU, for example, the law of tying remains form-based, in the sense
that authorities do not have to examine the effects of the conduct on
competition or consumers.201 Take the case of Windows Media Player,
where the EC found that Microsoft had illegally tied its media-player
software to its Windows operating system.202 On appeal, it was suffi-
cient for the European General Court that (a) Microsoft had a domi-
nant position in the OS market, (b) Windows and Windows Media
Player were separate products, and (c) Microsoft did not let users ob-
196. See supra subsection III.D.2.
197. EC Digital Competition Report, supra note 11, at 4.
198. Id. See also STIGLER, supra note 11, at 77 (“Burdens of proof might be switched by
adopting rules that will presume anticompetitive harm on the basis of prelimi-
nary showings by antitrust plaintiffs and shift a burden of exculpation to the
defendant or by ensuring that plaintiffs are not required to prove matters to
which the defendants have greater knowledge and better access to relevant
information.”).
199. EC Digital Competition Report, supra note 11, at 66–67.
200. Maurits Dolmans & Tobias Pesch, Should We Disrupt Antitrust Law?, 5 COMPETI-
TION L. & POL’Y DEBATE 71, 79 (2019).
201. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-03601, ¶ 1058 (noting
that the EC had conducted an effects analysis, but concluding that “the Commis-
sion’s findings in the first stage of its reasoning [i.e., that the tying arrangement
existed] are in themselves sufficient to establish that [the foreclosure element is
satisfied]”).
202. Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft Corp., Comm’n Decision (Mar. 24, 2004).
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tain Windows without Windows Media Player.203 The EC did not have
to demonstrate the actual effects of the conduct on competition.204
Under the EC Digital Competition Report’s proposal, an authority
would similarly be able to point to a form of conduct and enjoin the
firm from performing it, absent any evidence that the conduct actually
harms consumers. In other words, all leveraging would be presump-
tively anti-competitive. This is odd in light of the fact that the Report
concedes that self-preferencing, a form of leveraging, should be subject
to an effects-based analysis.205 Nonetheless, the EU Digital Competi-
tion Report argues that leveraging “should be forbidden in the absence
of clearly documented consumer welfare gains,” even in circumstances
where “consumer harm cannot be precisely measured.”206
As to a firm’s ability to show a pro-competitive rationale, it is al-
ready difficult in the EU, where this proposal has been promulgated,
to justify exclusionary conduct.207 As Richard Whish and David Bailey
recognize in their authoritative textbook, they “are not aware of any
case in which an efficiency defence has succeeded under Article
102.”208 This is despite the fact that European authorities and courts
too have recognized the legitimate act of a dominant firm excluding
competitors by simply doing a better job.209 Given the tough burden
that dominant firms already carry of showing pro-competitive justifi-
cations in the EU, making the standard any more strict will collapse
an effects-based model for leveraging by platform owners into blanket
non-discrimination, with the same implications for consumer welfare.
The EU Digital Competition Report itself admits as much, citing for
its proposition a report from the French telecoms regulator which ad-
vocates “a principle of ‘net neutrality’ for smartphones, tablets and
voice assistants.”210
203. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-03601, ¶¶ 854–59 (ac-
cepting the EC’s arguments regarding the constituent elements of a tying claim);
Christian Ahlborn & David S. Evans, The Microsoft Judgment and its Implica-
tions for Competition Policy Towards Dominant Firms in Europe, 75 ANTITRUST
L.J. 887, 907 (2009) (“[I]n order to satisfy the ‘foreclosure of competition’ element
of the tying abuse, the CFI found that it was sufficient to demonstrate the exis-
tence of an advantage from tying over rivals which do not have opportunity to
bundle. The impact of such an advantage on competition and consumer welfare
will then be presumed and need not be established.”).
204. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-03601, ¶ 1058.
205. EC Digital Competition Report, supra note 11 at 66.
206. Id. at 42.
207. Ahlborn & Evans, supra note 203, at 905 (noting that the “defense of objective
justification has played no role in the outcome of [EU tying] cases.”).
208. RICHARD WHISH & DAVID BAILEY, COMPETITION LAW 218 (9th ed. 2018).
209. See, e.g., Case C-413/14 P, Intel v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. 632, ¶¶ 133–34.
210. Id. at 67 n.91 (citing ARCEP, Smartphones, Tablettes, Assistants Vocaux . . . les
Terminaux, Maillon Faible de l’Ouverture d’Internet, Rapport sur leur Limites et
sur les Actions a‘ Envisager 2018, available at https://www.arcep.fr/uploads/
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B. Empirical Criteria for Abrogating Consumer Welfare
Each of the above proposals would, to varying degrees, dissolve the
distinction between pro- and anti-competitive leveraging and, in the
case of structural separation, pro- and anti-competitive adjacent mar-
ket entry. The question then becomes whether we should ignore the
incentive to innovate in inter-platform markets and turn our societal
interests to intra-platform competition. This section examines the em-
pirical criteria that we should expect to see satisfied before we take
this drastic step.
1. Strategic Bottleneck Power
In past instances of regulation or structural separation of verti-
cally integrated firms, there has been a concern that the entities had
strategic “bottleneck” power over the distribution of some downstream
product or service. This is true of the must-carry provisions imposed
on cable operators,211 the non-discrimination principle enshrined in
§ 616,212 and since-repealed net neutrality regulation.213 The same is
logically true of structural separation, since it is more intrusive. When
the District Court approved the consent decree structurally separat-
ing AT&T’s long-distance arm from its local operating companies, it
was motivated by the fact that “the principal means by which AT&T
has maintained monopoly power in telecommunications has been its
control of the Operating Companies with their strategic bottleneck po-
sition.”214 Khan, in her proposal to structurally separate platforms
from adjacent businesses, notes that past enforcement of separations
tx_gspublication/rapport-terminaux-fev2018.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/U7C4-
FNHT] [last visited Aug. 29, 2019]).
211. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.
v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 197 (1997) (for example, Justice Kennedy wrote that “cable
operators had considerable and growing market power over local video program-
ming markets” and that “only one percent of communities are served by more
than one cable system”).
212. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC v. FCC (noting that Congress enacted the Cable
Act to “curb abuses of cable operators’ bottleneck monopoly power and to promote
competition in the cable television industry.”).
213. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 646 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (noting that the FCC had
“convincingly detailed how broadband providers’ position in the market gives
them the economic power to restrict edge-provider traffic and charge for the ser-
vices they furnish edge providers. Because all end users generally access the In-
ternet through a single broadband provider, that provider functions as a
‘terminating monopolist’ with power to act as a ‘gatekeeper’ with respect to edge
providers that might seek to reach its end-user subscribers.”). That said, net neu-
trality was repealed in 2018 in part because it was found that broadband provid-
ers faced competitive pressure. See Restoring Internet Freedom Order, FCC Rcd.
17-166 (2018), at ¶¶ 123–38.
214. United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 171 (D.D.C. 1982) (emphasis
added).
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regimes has involved “particular markets and services where a bottle-
neck facility served as infrastructure or a critical intermediary.”215
Two questions arise, one theoretical and one empirical. The first is
what it means to possess strategic bottleneck power. A firm with stra-
tegic bottleneck power sits between suppliers and consumers and,
through the control of some vital input or method of distribution,
hegemonizes access between the two. The early case of U.S. v. Termi-
nal R.R. Ass’n of St. Louis exemplifies what it means to possess such
power.216 Often invoked as the maiden case of the “essential facilities”
doctrine,217 the Supreme Court in Terminal Railroad mandated a
group of firms that controlled the only railroad bridge across the Mis-
sissippi River into and out of St. Louis to grant rival railroads access
to the bridge on “just and reasonable” terms.218 The bottleneck power
inherent in ownership of the bridge derived from the fact that, topo-
graphically, there was no alternative route for railroads into or out of
St. Louis, such that “every train that hoped to pass through St. Louis
to and from different parts of the country had to cross the Mississippi
River.”219 Moreover, a bridge is a classic example of a “natural monop-
oly,” in the sense that economies of scale are so large relative to con-
sumer demand that the market can efficiently sustain only one
firm.220 In Terminal Railroad, constructing another bridge, “even if
feasible, would have been economically inefficient and socially waste-
ful.”221 It is easy to conclude, on these facts, that the consortium of
firms that denied access to the bridge to rival railroads possessed stra-
tegic bottleneck power. In cases of natural monopoly, there is a
stronger case for switching the focus from the monopolist’s continued
incentive to innovate to the innovation incentives in the downstream
215. Khan, supra note 13, at 1048.
216. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
217. See, e.g., Marina L. Lao, Networks, Access, and Essential Facilities: From Termi-
nal Railroad to Microsoft, 62 S.M.U. L. REV. 557 (2009) (“Generally seen as
originating in the Supreme Court’s 1912 Terminal Railroad decision, the essen-
tial facilities doctrine holds that a dominant firm’s refusal to grant access to a
facility it controls, which is necessary for competition and infeasible to replicate,
may give rise to antitrust liability.”); Sandeep Vaheesan, Reviving an Epithet: A
New Way Forward for the Essential Facilities Doctrine, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 911,
918 (2010) (“The [essential facilities] doctrine’s origin is typically traced to the
1912 Supreme Court case United States v. Terminal Railroad Ass’n.”).
218. Terminal R.R., 224 U.S. at 411.
219. Lao, supra note 21717, at 568.
220. Glen O. Robinson, On Refusing to Deal with Rivals, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1177,
1207 (2002) (“In nearly every case [of essential facilities], the facilities are capital
assets that cannot be economically duplicated given the size of the market—a
communications network, a central terminal facility, stadium, or energy trans-
mission facilities.”).
221. Lao, supra note 21717, at 568.
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market.222 This is because “[a] natural monopoly, while not procompe-
titive as such, is economically unavoidable.”223
However, it is insufficient to postulate that digital platform owners
possess strategic bottleneck power without empirically verifying
whether they do so in practice. The following discussion demonstrates
that this conclusion is dubious.
Take the concerns with Google Search outlined in subsection I.B.1
above. In the EC’s decision in Google Shopping, it found that referrals
from Google Search accounted for a large proportion of traffic to rival
comparison shopping websites and that traffic could not be effectively
replaced by other sources.224 However, casual empiricism reveals that
firms operating in adjacent markets have many more routes to con-
sumers that flout discovery through a search engine.225 As John Tem-
ple Lang observes, they can access consumers through “direct
navigation, specialized search services, social networks such as
Facebook and Pinterest, partnerships with PC and mobile device mar-
kets, agreements with other publishers to refer traffic to each other,
and so on.”226 Geoffrey Manne argues that, to the extent that vertical
search firms like comparison shopping owners invest specific assets to
distribute through Google Search and ignore these other channels,
this is a significant business risk that would be considered foolish by
industry specialists.227
Also consider Apple’s iOS and Google’s Android. First, they com-
pete against each other and thus neither firm, by definition, can pos-
sess the degree of strategic bottleneck power required to abandon
their respective incentives to innovate.228 Neither developers nor
222. Marina L. Lao, Search, Essential Facilities, and the Antitrust Duty to Deal, 11
NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 275, 289 (2013) (making this point).
223. Daniel E. Troy, Unclogging the Bottleneck: A New Essential Facility Doctrine, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 441, 443 (1983).
224. Google Shopping, supra note 36, at ¶ 539.
225. Robert H. Bork & J. Gregory Sidak, What Does the Chicago School Teach About
Internet Search and the Antitrust Treatment of Google?, 8 J. COMPETITION L. &
ECON. 663, 669–72 (2012) (arguing that Google Search is not a “gateway” to the
internet).
226. John Temple Lang, Comparing Microsoft and Google: The Concept of Exclusion-
ary Abuse, 39 WORLD COMPETITION 5 (2017).
227. GEOFFREY A. MANNE, THE REAL REASON FOUNDEM FOUNDERED 6–8 (ICLE Anti-
trust & Consumer Protection Research Program, White Paper 2018-02) (quoting
Ana Hoffman, Where Does Website Traffic Come from: Search Engine and Refer-
ral Traffic, TRAFFIC GENERATION CAFE (Mar. 12, 2018), https://trafficgeneration-
cafe.com/website-traffic-source-search-engine-referral/ [https://perma.unl.edu/
5W8X-3NXG]).
228. Sundar Pichai, Android has Created More Choice, Not Less, THE KEYWORD (July
18, 2018), https://www.blog.google/around-the-globe/google-europe/android-has-
created-more-choice-not-less/ [https://perma.unl.edu/Y285-U4L3] (“The [EC] deci-
sion ignores the fact that Android phones compete with iOS phones, something
that 89 percent of respondents to the Commission’s own market survey con-
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users are locked in once they start developing for or using Android or
iOS.229 Moreover, app developers can circumvent Google and Apple’s
control over their respective app stores within those companies’ plat-
form ecosystems. For example, they can distribute their application to
users through a web-browser. Spotify, for example, eludes Apple’s sub-
scription fee by directing users to subscribe to its premium service on
its website. Apple claims that it takes a cut of Spotify’s subscription
revenue for only 680,000 of Spotify’s 100 million users, as Spotify only
converted users from free to premium through Apple’s in-app
purchase function from 2014 to 2016.230 Similarly, Amazon circum-
vents Apple’s cut of sales by preventing its customers from purchasing
e-books through its iPhone or iPad apps, but allowing such purchases
through Apple’s web-browser (where Apple does not take a cut).231
As a final example, consider whether Amazon has strategic bottle-
neck power over online retail; in other words, whether merchants can,
without incurring significant cost, access consumers without relying
on Amazon’s platform infrastructure. The German competition au-
thority found that “[m]any sellers find Amazon’s marketplace very im-
portant for their online sales, especially in terms of access to
customers.”232 However, this is not the same as all sellers finding Am-
azon’s platform vital as a means of accessing consumers. As of July
2018, Amazon accounted for just under half of all online sales in the
U.S.233 This may seem a staggering volume, but it in fact proves that
distributors can—and do—bypass Amazon’s platform to reach con-
sumers, with great success. In 2017, the EC published the report of its
e-commerce inquiry, which found that 90% of retailers sell through
their own online shops, while 4% of retailers sell only through market-
places like Amazon.234 Indeed, some manufacturers have been known
firmed.”). But see Android Decision, supra note 3, at ¶¶ 238–39 (finding that
“non-licensable smart mobile OSs such as iOS and Blackberry OS do not belong
to the same product market as licensable smart mobile OSs” because “OEMs can-
not obtain a license to use iOS or Blackberry OS.”).
229. Todd, supra note 151.
230. Markus Becker, Apple Wehrt Sich Fegen Spotify-Vorwu¨rfe, SPIEGEL (June 24,
2019), https://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/netzpolitik/spotify-beschwerde-bei-eu-
kommission-apple-wehrt-sich-a-1273755.html [https://perma.unl.edu/9U37-
9AKC].
231. Connery Carey, How to Buy Amazon Kindle Books on the iPhone or iPad, iPhone
Life (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.iphonelife.com/content/how-to-buy-kindle-books-
iphone-or-ipad [https://perma.unl.edu/HK3D-CBNN].
232. Bundeskartellamt Amazon Press Release, supra note 61 (emphasis added).
233. Ingrid Lunden, Amazon’s Share of the US E-Commerce Market Is Now 49%, or 5%
of All Retail Spend, TECHCRUNCH (July 13, 2018), http://social.techcrunch.com/
2018/07/13/amazons-share-of-the-us-e-commerce-market-is-now-49-or-5-of-all-re
tail-spend/ [https://perma.unl.edu/5HMA-K9JF] (last visited June 30, 2019).
234. Report from the Commission to the Council and European Parliament, Final Re-
port on the E-commerce Sector Inquiry, at 134, COM (2017) 229 final (Oct. 5,
2017).
2019] DIGITAL PLATFORMS & THE LEVERAGE PROBLEM 533
to contractually prohibit their distributors from selling their goods on
Amazon, due inter alia to brand protection.235 The importance of on-
line marketplaces as a distribution channel also varies according to
geography and the type of goods involved.236 These findings show that
Amazon is a far-cry from possessing strategic bottleneck power.
As this section has shown, it is unlikely that the tech companies
that have been the subject of criticism possess strategic bottleneck
power. Insofar as GAFA possess such power over particular categories
of goods, this would not justify shifting the focus to intra-platform
competition across all product categories. The market power element
of traditional antitrust analyses serves to guard competition in these
circumstances by carving a remedy around conduct that illegitimately
hampers the ability of adjacent market competitors to compete.
Furthermore, even if GAFA did possess strategic bottleneck power,
this would be a necessary but not sufficient criterion to justify disre-
garding pro-competitive leveraging and consumer welfare. Indeed,
Microsoft was a good candidate for having strategic bottleneck power
over the distribution of software applications at the time of United
States v. Microsoft, given that applications had to be distributed
through a PC OS and Microsoft had a greater than 95% of this mar-
ket.237 However, the D.C. Circuit recognized that other factors,
namely the benefits to consumers of product integration, weighed
against imposing unbundling or structural separation. The D.C. Cir-
cuit thus surgically dismantled Microsoft’s anti-competitive behavior
while allowing consumers the benefits from pro-competitive
leveraging.238
2. Widespread Harm in Adjacent Markets
To ban platform owners from leveraging anti-competitively and
pro-competitively, either through non-discrimination or structural
separation, one would expect there to be cogent evidence of harm to
competition across a multitude of adjacent goods that depend on the
platforms for access to consumers. There should be such obvious long-
term negative effects on consumer welfare that it is worth sacrificing
the benefits of pro-competitive leveraging to prevent such harms from
materializing. When Congress enacted the must-carry obligations, for
example, it was in possession of “extensive anecdotal evidence about
235. Id. at 142–44 (finding that 18% of retailers are limited in some way in their abil-
ity to sell through online marketplaces, while 12% of retailers are banned from
using online marketplaces completely).
236. Id. at 139–40.
237. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (accepting the
District Court’s finding that Microsoft had a share of over 95% in the market for
Intel-compatible PC operating systems.).
238. See supra section III.E.
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scores of adverse carriage decisions against broadcast stations.”239 In-
deed, there was evidence that, by 1988, nearly a quarter of all broad-
cast stations had been denied carriage.240
Conversely, there is a dearth of evidence of such widespread harms
in digital markets.241 There is some empirical support for the proposi-
tion that adjacent market entry by platform owners dampens or skews
innovation incentives of firms in adjacent markets. A study by Wen
Wen and Feng Zhu found that Google’s entry, or threat of entry, into
app markets for the Android OS caused app developers in those mar-
kets to increase their prices and cease innovating in the affected app
markets.242 However, developers responded by shifting their efforts to
other app markets and continuing to innovate by introducing new
apps that were not similar to Google’s. The authors thus concede that
“platform owners could use direct entry to shape the innovation direc-
tions of complementors, reduce social inefficiency, and encourage more
variety.”243 Platform entry, the authors found, may also be motivated
by the desire to control quality on the platform.244 For example, the
authors pointed out that Google’s entry into flashlight apps may have
been motivated by users’ privacy concerns in relation to existing third-
party offerings.245
In another study, Feng Zhu and Qihong Liu found that Amazon’s
entry into third-party sellers’ product markets “discourages affected
third-party sellers from subsequently pursuing growth on the plat-
form.”246 However, again, consumer welfare does not necessarily suf-
fer from this finding. Indeed, the authors concluded that consumers
“benefit from Amazon’s efficient distribution systems and because of it
are more likely to purchase the products.”247 Amazon’s entry into ad-
jacent market enables the provision of lower delivery costs.248
Moreover, other empirical studies show that third-party producers
can benefit from platform entry into adjacent markets. One study by
Foerderer et al. found that Google’s entry into photography apps for
the Android OS created additional consumer awareness of and de-
239. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 202 (1997).
240. Id. at 203.
241. Feng Zhu & Qihong Liu, Competing with Complementors: An Empirical Look at
Amazon.com, 39 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 2618, 2619 (2018) (“Empirical evidence on
platform owners’ entry strategies with respect to complementary markets is
scant.”).
242. Wen Wen & Feng Zhu, Threat of Platform-Owner Entry and Complementor Re-
sponses: Evidence from the Mobile App Market, 40 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1336
(2019).
243. Id. at 19.
244. Id. at 19 n.27.
245. Id.
246. Zhu & Liu, supra note 2411.
247. Id. at 28.
248. Id.
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mand for photography apps generally, which benefitted third-party
producers.249 Another paper by Zhuoxin Li and Ashish Agarwal stud-
ied the effect of Facebook’s integration of Instagram on third-party
producers.250 The authors found that users benefitted from the closer
integration of Instagram and Facebook, and that third-party produc-
ers benefitted from users’ increased awareness of the app
ecosystem.251
In a survey of empirical studies into platform owners’ entry into
adjacent markets, Zhu cautions that the existing literature focuses on
short-run effects on users and third-party producers, but that long-
run effects are ambiguous and still unmeasurable.252 What is clear,
however, is that the criterion that this Article has identified as a pre-
requisite to imposing blanket regulation to control the behavior of
platform owners—widespread evidence of harm in adjacent markets—
has not been satisfied. Instead, intervention should remain targeted
and evidence-based. Where a complainant or authority can adduce ev-
idence that a platform is leveraging into an adjacent market and rais-
ing rivals’ costs of doing business, and where the platform owner
cannot show a pro-competitive justification for the behavior, then anti-
trust law will intervene to enjoin the behavior. For this, no regulatory
intervention is necessary and consumer welfare is preserved.
3. Static Product Boundaries
In prior cases of access regulation, the input that adjacent market
rivals have depended on for access to consumers has been clearly dis-
tinguishable from the rivals’ products. However, digital platforms are
not railroads on which rolling stock sits and trundles along.253 Plat-
form owners constantly introduce new features and functionalities to
their platforms to the benefit of both users and third-party distribu-
tors and integrate those features and functionalities with the platform
itself. Antitrust literature commonly refers to “platforms” and “appli-
cations” as if these are perceptibly different products, but the reality is
much different: both platforms and their complementary applications
are composed of individual components. Any attempt to freeze the def-
initional boundary of a platform would negate platform owners’ incen-
249. Jens Foerderer et al., Does Platform Owner’s Entry Crowd Out Innovation? Evi-
dence from Google Photos, 29 INF. SYST. RES. 444 (2018).
250. Zhuoxin Li & Ashish Agarwal, Platform Integration and Demand Spillovers in
Complementary Markets: Evidence from Facebook’s Integration of Instagram, 63
MGMT. SCI. 3438 (2017).
251. Id.
252. Feng Zhu, Friends or Foes? Examining Platform Owners’ Entry into Comple-
mentors’ Spaces, 28 J. ECON. & MGMT. 23 (2018).
253. See EC Digital Competition Report, supra note 11, at 67 (“When compared to the
traditional infrastructures (e.g., rail, energy networks), platforms differ as as-
pects of infrastructure provision and service provision may be mixed.”).
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tive to build upon and improve their platforms, to the detriment of
consumers. Consider the following components that Apple produces
in-house: voice assistant (Siri), alarm, camera, and payment system
(Apple Pay). These components are distributed with Apple’s iOS plat-
form and in essence form part of the OS itself. If Apple were prevented
from vertically integrating, would it be allowed to be active in these
adjacent markets? What would iOS look like? Could it even have a
voice-call function? Alternatively, under non-discrimination regula-
tion, what would a new iOS phone look like? Would it just be a blank
screen where the user is then forced to choose between various alter-
natives? The problem with proposing to separate platforms from adja-
cent products (structurally or behaviorally) is that any platform
component can theoretically be modularized and opened to competi-
tion by third parties.254 When one breaks a platform down into its
individual components and prevents adjacent market entry or lever-
aging, it is not clear what remains of the platform itself. Because inte-
gration of complementary components is an essential part of inter-
platform competition, imposing the proposed regulation would destroy
the very ecosystems that the competitors that critics seek to protect
depend on.
This point was central to the D.C. Circuit’s analysis of the tying
claim in United States v Microsoft. Under the Supreme Court’s judg-
ment in Jefferson Parish, to establish a tying claim a plaintiff must
show that the tying and tied products are separate in the sense that
“there is a sufficient demand for the purchase of [the tied product]
separate from [the tying product] to identify a distinct product market
in which it is efficient to offer [the tied good] separately from [the ty-
ing good].”255 In Jefferson Parish, anesthesiological services were tied
to hospital services. Previous cases involved, inter alia, the tying of
dry ice to refrigeration containers, punch cards to business machines,
salt to salt machines, railway lines to land sale agreements, prefabri-
cated homes to advantageous credit terms, and films to movie projec-
tors. However, the D.C. Circuit recognized the limits of a “separate
products” analysis where the conduct concerns software platforms and
tying is technological and integrative rather than contractual.256 In no
254. Modularity has been defined as “organizing complements (products that work
with one another) to interoperate through public, nondiscriminatory, and well-
understood interfaces.” Modularity allows for a “smooth dissemination of the best
of breed in each level or layer, as users mix and match components.” See Farrell
& Weiser, supra note 24, at 95. See also Christopher S. Yoo, Open Source, Modu-
lar Platforms, and the Challenge of Fragmentation, 1 CRITERION J. ON INNOVA-
TION 619, 620 (2016) (defining platforms as “standardized architectures that
divide complex systems into modules and define the interfaces that link these
modules.”).
255. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 21–22 (1984).
256. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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previous case “was the tied good physically and technologically inte-
grated with the tying good.”257 The consumer demand test within the
“separate products” criterion, the Court found, is a “rough proxy for
whether a tying arrangement may, on balance, be welfare-enhancing
and unsuited to per se condemnation.”258 However, the analysis is a
“poor proxy for net efficiency from newly integrated products”259 be-
cause it could “chill innovation to the detriment of consumers by
preventing firms from integrating into their products new functional-
ity previously provided by standalone products—and hence, by defini-
tion, subject to separate consumer demand.” The proposed
intervention would freeze the definitional boundaries of platforms, to
the detriment of consumers.
If there was evidence that the development of platforms had
peaked and fizzled out, there may be a case for disregarding platform
owners’ continued incentive to innovate in the platform market by in-
troducing new features. However, there is so such evidence. Together,
Alphabet (Google’s parent company), Amazon, Facebook, and Apple
accounted for over $70 billion in R&D spending in 2018.260 Apple re-
leases at least one new version of its iOS platform per year, with each
release invariably including new features that were or could have
been produced by third parties.261 The same is true of Google with
Android.262 Because the definition of a platform is constantly evolv-
ing, there is no justification for ignoring firms’ incentive to innovate in
the platform markets in order to exclusively promote intra-platform
competition. Instead, competition policy should promote the continued
development of platform systems while deterring and tackling the in-
stances in which a platform owner anti-competitively shuts out a
downstream rival. A policy which prevents platforms from integrating
new features in order to protect less efficient downstream firms will
decrease platform owners’ impetus to enter adjacent markets and
compete on the merits.
257. Id. at 90.
258. Id. at 87.
259. Id. at 92 (quoting Pl.’s Op. Br. Summ. J. 69) (internal quotations omitted).
260. Statistica, Ranking of the 20 Companies with the Highest Spending on Research
and Development in 2018 (in Billion U.S. Dollars), STATISTA, https://www.statista
.com/statistics/265645/ranking-of-the-20-companies-with-the-highest-spending-
on-research-and-development/ [https://perma.unl.edu/N4U4-257C] (last visited
Aug. 29, 2019).
261. iOS Version History, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IOS_version_histo
ry [https://perma.unl.edu/L9NN-GM2A] (last visited Aug. 29, 2019).
262. Android Version History, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_ver
sion_history [https://perma.unl.edu/J477-T4LQ] (last visited Aug. 29, 2019).
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4. Lack or Unimportance of Integration Efficiencies
Proponents of non-discrimination or structural separation may
counter that efficiencies stemming from leveraging are unimportant
or non-existent, or do not depend on conduct that has exclusionary
effects. However, as this Article has demonstrated, there are in fact
many consumer benefits that arise from leveraging.263 In this respect,
it is telling that § 616 (on which Singer’s Net Tribunal is based) has
been held to import antitrust concepts, such as “business justifica-
tions”264 and the wider principle that “the goal of antitrust law (and
thus of § 616) is to promote consumer welfare by protecting competi-
tion, not by protecting individual competitors.”265 For example, in one
case the Tennis Channel, a sports programming network, alleged that
Comcast, an MVPD, unlawfully discriminated against it by “refusing
to broadcast Tennis as widely as it did its own affiliated sports pro-
gramming networks.”266 The D.C. Circuit held that, despite the fact
that Comcast distributed its own channels more widely than it did the
Tennis Channel,267 this conduct was justified by reference to valid
business justifications such as there being no consumer demand for
wider distribution of the Tennis Channel.268 The D.C. Circuit held
that factors that Comcast must weigh when deciding to carry a net-
work include “the nature of the programming content involved,” “the
intensity and size of the fan base for that content,” and “the level of
service sought by the network.”269
An MVPD can therefore refuse to carry a channel on an equal foot-
ing to its equivalent channels if there is a valid reason for doing so
that benefits consumers. The case for disregarding pro-competitive
leveraging by digital platforms seems weak in light of the fact that
even the § 616 regime preserves the distinction between pro- and anti-
competitive leveraging in circumstances where there are clear product
boundaries (cable operation versus programming) and integrative effi-
ciencies are likely to be unimportant. Under an equivalent standard,
platform owners could continue to favor their own ancillary products
263. See supra subsection III.D.2.
264. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC v. FCC, 717 F.3d 982, 985 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“[I]f
the MVPD treats vendors differently based on a reasonable business purpose (ob-
viously excluding any purpose to illegitimately hobble the competition from [the
complainant channel]), there is no violation.”); Tennis Channel, Inc. v. FCC, 827
F.3d 137, 140 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (holding that the D.C. Circuit in Comcast Cable
Commc’ns. had found that “there was not substantial evidence to show that Com-
cast had not based its tiering decision on business considerations.”); see also TCR
Sports Broad. Holding LLP v. FCC, 679 F.3d 269, 274–77 (4th Cir. 2012).
265. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, 717 F.3d at 992.
266. Id. at 983.
267. Id. at 985.
268. Id. at 986.
269. Id. at 985.
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within their platforms if doing so provided the best experience for
users. The fact that this outcome is the same as under the current
antitrust regime means that an equivalent to § 616 for digital plat-
forms is superfluous.270
To justify the more extreme proposal of structural separation,
which sacrifices benefits from both leveraging and adjacent market en-
try in favor of a per se rule against vertical integration, one would ex-
pect the Neo-Brandeisians’ to at least present cogent evidence that
adjacent market entry does not benefit consumers. However, this as-
sumption does not reflect reality either.271 Indeed, Khan concedes
that “limiting a network monopolist’s ability to compete on its own
network would sacrifice certain cost savings.”272 This heedlessness for
consumer benefits also explains Neo-Brandeisians’ propensity to lam-
baste vertical mergers, such as Amazon’s acquisition of Whole Foods,
even where there is no proven likelihood of anti-competitive effects in
terms of price or quality.273 Indeed, the integration of Amazon and
Whole Foods engendered a series of price reductions and encouraged
rival grocery stores to improve their online ordering infrastructure,
which, as one commentator notes, is “exactly the type of price competi-
tion and product innovation that antitrust is designed to foster.”274
In any case, even if efficiencies and other business justifications for
leveraging or adjacent market entry were absent or unimportant
(which, as demonstrated, they are not), the consumer welfare frame-
work would already tackle leveraging in these circumstances by con-
demning firms that leverage without valid business justification;
therefore, if efficiencies were lacking, there would be no need for non-
discrimination or structural separation.275
Unless and until the criteria examined in this Part are empirically
verified, we should not consider superseding the consumer welfare
standard that protects the legitimate ability of dominant firms to
270. Why, then, does Section 616 exist for MVPDs? One reason is that Congress en-
acted Section 616 to authorize the FCC to regulate the practices of cable opera-
tors, akin to, in the words of then-Judge Kavanaugh in Comcast Cable Commc’ns,
“adding new police officers to enforce an existing law.” Id. at 991 n.1.
271. See supra subsection III.D.1.
272. Khan, supra note 13, at 1080.
273. Press Release, Open Markets Institute, Open Markets Statement on AT&T/Time
Warner Decision (June 12, 2018), https://openmarketsinstitute.org/releases/open-
markets-statement-att-time-warner-decision/ [https://perma.unl.edu/7ZHU-
QW73]; Lina M. Khan, Amazon Bites off Even More Monopoly Power, N.Y. TIMES
(June 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/21/opinion/amazon-whole-
foods-jeff-bezos.html [https://perma.unl.edu/VQM3-8C8D].
274. Jonathan M. Barnett, Thanks to Smart Antitrust, Whole Foods is No Longer
‘Whole Paycheck’, THE HILL (Apr. 8, 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/
437775-thank-smart-antitrust-for-your-cheaper-whole-foods-tab [https://perma
.unl.edu/E6BA-BV59].
275. See supra section III.E.
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enter adjacent markets and out-compete their rivals by leveraging
pro-competitively. To the extent that regulatory agencies can inter-
vene to enforce the consumer welfare standard more quickly, even de-
vout Chicagoans would agree that quick antitrust enforcement is
better for consumer welfare. However, there is at present no case for
denying platform owners the ability to show that their product de-
signs are pro-competitive in order to prop up less efficient competitors
in adjacent markets.
V. CONCLUSION
Writing in 1965, Robert Bork and Ward Bowman Jr. described
how, “[f]rom its inception with the passage of the Sherman Act’ in
1890, antitrust has vacillated between the policy of preserving compe-
tition and the policy of preserving competitors from their more ener-
getic and efficient rivals.”276 This “crisis in antitrust” has flared up
again, with a renewed debate over the proper ideological goals of anti-
trust policy in the twenty-first century.
This Article has sought to contribute to the debate surrounding
dominant firms and adjacent market competition in the digital econ-
omy. Historical analysis tells us that the leverage doctrine was im-
ported from patent to antitrust law without a rigorous economic
rationale to explain why firms engaged in the conduct that was
deemed anti-competitive. This resulted in pervasive hostility towards
leveraging behavior that coincided with a general hostility towards
vertical integration in the early- to mid-twentieth century. However,
Chicago School scholars observed that there is often only a single mo-
nopoly profit to be earned in any vertical distribution chain, and that
monopolists rarely have the incentive to leverage anti-competitively.
Instead, adjacent market entry and leveraging are predominantly mo-
tivated by efficiencies that benefit consumers. This Article has set
forth why the Chicago critique of anti-competitive leveraging is still
relevant and can be used as a starting point for assessing leveraging
in the digital economy, as demonstrated by the D.C. Circuit’s
landmark ruling in United States v. Microsoft.
However, scholars have recently questioned whether antitrust law
should value short-term consumer gains over potential, albeit as yet
unmeasurable, long-term harms in the form of dampened innovation
incentives in adjacent markets, caused by platform owners’ adjacent
market entry and leveraging behavior. Whether one views leveraging
by dominant firms to be harmful generally or only when it directly
276. Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
363 (1965).
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harms consumers is ultimately an ideological question.277 While Chi-
cagoans have no qualms about the rise of firm “bigness” due to supe-
rior efficiency, critics would readily sacrifice the consumer benefits
that increased firm-size can bring about in order to redistribute busi-
ness opportunities. However, this Article has analyzed the policy pro-
posals put forward by critics of the consumer welfare standard,
including prophylactic controls on adjacent market entry, non-dis-
crimination regulation, and imposing a greater burden of proof upon
platform owners accused of anti-competitive leveraging, exposing
their demerits. Unless and until critics verify that digital platforms
hold bottleneck monopoly power over distribution, there are wide-
spread anti-competitive harms in adjacent markets, products bounda-
ries are static, and integrative efficiencies are lacking or unimportant,
the consumer welfare standard under antitrust law should prevail
without recourse to regulatory intervention.
Competition policy is “an expression of the current values and aims
of society and is as susceptible to change as political thinking gener-
ally.”278 While the fresh identity crisis in antitrust policy rages on, the
author hopes that this Article has contributed to one dimension of the
debate.
277. See Marina L. Lao, Ideology Matters in the Antitrust Debate, 79 ANTITRUST L.J.
649, 669 (2014) (“To antitrust conservatives, antitrust liberals may seem too dis-
missive of evidence of efficiencies and too receptive to evidence of anticompetitive
harm. No doubt, to antitrust liberals, antitrust conservatives may seem biased in
the opposite directions.”); Joshua D. Wright, Abandoning Antitrust’s Chicago Ob-
session: The Case for Evidence-Based Antitrust, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 241, 262 (2012)
(“The finer details of economics and evidence play only a complementary role to
the application of antitrust doctrines rather than take center stage. Antitrust de-
bates thereby become increasingly ideological and insensitive to empirical
evidence.”).
278. WHISH & BAILEY, supra note 208, at 19.
